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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"Under present international trade law, a can of tuna is a can of tuna — regardless of
whether thousands of dolphins were killed in the process of catching that tuna."'

Tuna and dolphins have come

to

symbolize the policy struggle between trade and the

environment.- Both are primary values in an ecologically and economically interdependent
world.^ Unleashing trade without fetters

expense of trade and development.
two. Sustainable development

'

William

J.

Snape

III

is

& Naomi B.

as detrimental as guarding the environment at the

necessary to reconcile any differences between the

It is

the

is

theme

for the future.''

Lefkovitz, Searching for

GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are

CORNELL INT'L L. J. 777, 786 (1994). Such an "alarmist"
view may not be totally founded. See e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection
of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. iNT'L L. 700, 726 (1992). "Contrary to the alarmist
"Process Standards" Getting "Due Process'^'" 27

claims of some environmentalists, there

under the aegis of the

GATT

is

no inherent

conflict

and protection of environmental

between international trade as
quality.

The

it

GATT recognizes

policy instruments that can be used to protect domestic and global natural resources; the

environmental protection are largely compatible."

Environment, and the Future 53

(

1

'

See Snape

attention to the trade

&

994)[hereinafter Esty]. "The

Lefkovitz, supra note

and environment

conflict,

and

GATT

is

not as misguided as

some

NAFTA

drew

Id.

778.

1, at
it

GATT

See also DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE,

Id.

environmentalists would have the public believe."

has evolved

and contains

was

ESTY, supra note

1,

at 29.

Though

the tuna-dolphin dispute that "turned interest into fliry."

Id
^

See Esty, supra note

1

,

at

1

7-23.

The Brundtland Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development is believed
have coined the term "sustainable development" which defined it as
"(a) development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. It contains within two concepts:
(b) the concept of "needs", in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding

"

to

priority should be given;
(c) the ideal

and

of limitations imposed by the

state

of technology and social organizations on the

environment's ability to meet present and future needs." Phillippe Sands, International
Field ofSustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles, in SUSTAINABLE

International

Law

58 (Winfried Lang

ed., 1995)[hereinafter

1

Law

in the

DEVELOPMENT AND

"SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT"].

2
Until a

few decades ago, policy makers of both trade and environment concentrated

their efforts within their respective areas.

'^

Trade became institutionalized under the

"umbrella" of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT");^ and

World Trade Organization (WTO)'' and has

consistently developed.

environment has had a weak growth

to lack

such as the GATT.^

Its

growth

is

in part

due

of comprehensive

now

under the

In contrast, the
institutional entity

sporadic and sparse. Indeed, the relationship between the

The term "Sustainable Development" has been incorporated in numerous international treaties; for
Preamble to the WTO states: "Recognizing that their [members'] relations in the field of trade and
economic endeavor should be conducted with a view to the raising of standards of living, ensuring full
employment, and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding

e.g., the

the production and trade in

goods and

services, while allowing for the optimal use

of the worlds' resources

in

accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the

environment and enhance the means of doing

so." Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
Economic Relations 3 (3d. ed., 1995)[hereinafter Supplement]. The above principle was affirmed in
Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Adopted June 14, 1992, at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.l.,

April 14,

1

994, reprinted in

repnntedmZX

I.L.M. 874, 878 (1992).

^

ESTY, supra note

*

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S.

1, at 9.

GATT, BISD 4S/1 ( 969). On
Trade And The LawOfGatt(1969).
1

88, reprinted in

'

As

Organization

1

a result of the Uruguay

(WTO)

on January

1,

the origins of GATT, see generally

Round of

1995.

trade negotiations, the

Final Act

Embodying

JOHN H. JACKSON,

GATT

WORLD

became the World Trade
Uruguay Round of

the Results of the

Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1145(1994).

'

The

GATT

1947 was amended and modified through the Uruguay Round Negotiations.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, incorporates the
"fifteen

Agreements

are

annexed

to

GATT

GATT

Now

the

1994. In addition,

1994, the most important being the Agreement on Technical

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Agreement on
Agreement on Agriculture, and the Agreement on Services." Thomas
Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for

Barriers to Trade, the

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, the
J.

Reconciliation, 91

AM.

J.

INT'L L. 268, 271, n. 22 (1997).

See ESTY, supra note
at 77. The environment was given a strong impetus by the United Nations
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, in 1972, when the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) was established. Also, the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in
'

1

,

Rio de Janiero established "a new phase

economic

issues"

in international

environmental law

were joined. International Environmental

etal. eds., 1996)[hereinafter

ANTHOLOGY].

in

which environmental and

Law Anthology

5

(Anthony D' Amato

3

environment and trade was rarely seen. Generally,
Multilateral Environmental
lighting rod that

changed

it

was seen only

as

many

Agreements (MEAs) which contain trade

came with what

all this

dispute." In early 1990, the United States, based

is

now a notoriously

on

its

times are there

The

restrictions.'"

familiar Tuna-dolphin

domestic law, had banned the import

of tuna and tuna products from Mexico and other countries that were fishing in a manner that
caused damage to the dolphins in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean. Mexico challenged the

ban before the

ban

is

GATT.

A GATT Panel ruled against the United

inconsistent with the GATT.'-^

an "unexpected front" '^

~

The

GATT

the environmental

became

that the tuna

the subject of attack from rather

community.

The

environmental community and sent them into a fury, confirming

'°

and held

States

its

ruling enraged the

worst

fears.

'"^

Indeed,

Out of the nearly 150 or so multilateral environmental agreements, only around 19 or so have been
have trade restrictions. Schoenbaum, supra note 1, at 717 n. 94. ESTY, supra note 1, at 275

identified to

(listing the Multilateral

Environmental Agreements with trade provisions). The most popular ones

Convention on International Trade

in

Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

Flora, Mar. 3, 1973,

are:

1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Layer, 26 I.L.M. 1550 (1987)[hereinafter

The

27 U.S.T.

Ozone

Montreal Protocol]; the Basel Convention on the Control of

Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989)[hereinafter Basel
Convention].
"

1991.

The United

States'

See United States

Panel]. This decision

--

tuna ban was challenged twice before the

States

~

the

GATT Council or the Contracting

Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M.

challenge was

Parties.

in

Tuna

The second challenge

839 (1994)[hereinafter Second

'^

See chapter

'^

Schoenbaum, supra note

'"•

For a general description of the criticisms of environmentalists against,

II,

first

Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1598 (1992)[hereinafter First

was not adopted by

was in 1994. See United
Tuna Panel].

GATT. The

infra.

I,

Panel decision, see ESTY, supra note

at

700.

1, at

in particular the First

35-59; see also Schoenbaum, supra note

1,

at

700-704.

tuna

4
the environmentalists had a "catalogue of grievances" against free trade. '^

between the two has been excellently captured

the "policy discord"

Some
imperative.
stake.

At a general

level,

in the following passage:

environmentalists see protection of the environment as an absolute

Once

Free trade

destroyed,

cannot be replaced. The future of the planet

is at

it

is

is

only a relative value, a means to an end, and thus free traders are

it

only pragmatists with no absolute ideals. The protection of the environment, on the
other hand,

is

be unable to

Some
that

an absolute

ideal,

perhaps the ultimate ideal since without

it

we

will

live.

trade specialists see free trade (or the best approximation of free trade

can be achieved in the real world) as the only

way

to

maintain a healthy global

economy and support economic development. Protectionism led to the Great
Depression of the 1930s and World War II. There is no political security without
economic

security

and no economic security without a

market. Environmentalists

may have good

Basic

and do not

'^

GATT Rules

As the centerpiece of

the trade system, the

birth defects;''' and, has yet survived the passage

promote

rules designed to

and, by imposing a

'-

and competitive world

intentions, but they are naive

understand the real needs of most of the world today.

A.

free

set

free

and

Now

of time.

is

a "curious institution"

It is

by eliminating

fair trade. '^

of obligations.

GATT

under the

a multilateral
all

WTO,

bom with

framework of

forms of barriers to trade

the

"GATT

1994 not only

See generally A Catalogue of Grievances. THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993. Environmentalists
GATT (1) promotes free trade which leads to economic growth, but damages the environment;

claimed that

:

PPMs; (4) does not allow "eco"
DPGs; (7) does not allow the use of

(2) prevents use of higher environmental standards; (3) does not allow

subsidies; (5) encourages a "race to the bottom"
extraterritorial use

;

(6) prevents bans of

of environmental standards; (8) does not automatically validate international environmental

agreements; (9) does not allow participation of environmentalists

Haag, Legitimizing "Environmental" Legislation under the

Fuel for Protectionists'^ 57 U. PiTT. L. REV. 79

(

1

in

dispute resolution. Id See also Charles

GATT in Light of the CAFE Panel Report: More

995).

Robert A. Reinstein, Trade and Environment: The Case for and Against Unilateral Actions, in
Sustainable Development, ^wpra note 4, at 231. These statements of course reflect the diametrical
'*

positions of the trade and environment schools.

" JOHN H. Jackson, Restructuring The Gatt System
'*

For an excellent analysis of the

GATT,

see

1

(1990).

JACKSON, supra note

6.

.

5
establishes the normative structure for trade" but
international trade."

A GATT

destined

member

has three primary obligations.
is

found

in Article

First,

the most-favored nation or

The "foreign parity" requires

l.'°

State accord "unconditional" treatment
to,

also "seeks to further the goal of free

'^

"foreign parity" principle

member

it

to like

that

each

products originating from, or

other members.

Second,

GATT

imposes the "national treatment obligation" or "inland parity" by

prohibiting discrimination between domestically produced goods and imported goods

broadly in
in a

way

all respects.-'

This prohibits a

member

state

from imposing regulations or taxes

"so as to afford protection to domestic protection"--

or subject the imported

products either "directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind
in excess

Article

I,

of those applied, directly or indirectly,
paragraph

4,

it

states that

to like

domestic products."-^ Again in

imported products "shall be accorded no

treatment than that accorded to like products of national origin" in
Third,

GATT

all respects.

-*

prohibits the use of quotas or other quantitative restrictions

export or import of goods.-" However,
(a)

less favorable

some exceptions

are provided in paragraph

1

on the
namely

export restrictions on foodstuffs or other products to relieve critical shortages "essential"

to the contracting party;^^ (b)

import or export prohibitions necessary to the application of

" Schoenbaum, supra note

GATT

^°

Art.

^'

See Jackson, supra note

'^

Art.

I,

para.

^^

Art.

I,

para. 3,

GATT.

^'

Art.

I,

para. 4,

GATT.

"
^'

I,

Art. XI,

27

1

BISD. See JACKSON, supra note

1,GATT.

GATT.

Art. XI(2)(a),

8, at

GATT.

6, at

273-303.

6, at

249-272.

standards or regulations for the classification of commodities;-' and (c) "import restrictions

on any agricultural or

fisheries product that are necessary to the

governmental measures.""* Broadly, the above "three

which the
B.

enforcement of certain

framework with

pillars" constitute the

international trade policies are governed.

Environmental Exceptions Under the

GATT:How "Green" Are They?

The environmental exceptions that are relevant

XX of the GATT.

It

for our discussion are

found

in Article

provides in pertinent part:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a

means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
manner which would

constitute a

adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of such

measures:

(a)

necessary to protect public morals;

(b) necessary to protect

human, animal or plant

(g) relating to the conservation

measures are made effective
production or consumption.

In

its

interpretation of the

life

or health;

of exhaustible natural resources

in conjunction with restrictions

purposes.

above provision, and

level, the issue centers

The problem

barriers are raised. ^°

"

arises

How to

Art.

XI

2(b),

GATT.

2*

Art.

XI

2(c),

GATT.

-'

Art.

XX, GATT.

^°

See Haag, supra note

1

because

on domestic

in particular. Article

which need

XX(b) and

(g),

to be answered.

around the use of trade measures for environmental
in the

garb of environmental concerns, protectionist

separate the "wheat from the chaff

5, at 80.

such

..r^

the tuna-dolphin controversy has raised several policy questions

At the broadest

if

—

the genuine ones from

~

the disguised trade restrictions

is

a troubling issue.

The

further question

countries could unilaterally determine environmental standards.

beyond

jurisdiction?^-

known

to

its

It is

production modes.

produced by

Is

it

their

The use of

whether

unilateral

Likewise, should countries be allowed to

measures causes considerable controversy.^'
protect the environment

is

own borders,

or the shared environment, or be limited

may

be produced by either "clean" or "dirty"

that products

proper for the countries to refuse to allow products that have been

"dirty" production technologies, the "dirtiness", or rather the cleanliness,

being

determined by the regulating country's standard."

C.

A Search

For Solutions

In attempts to answer these questions

and reconcile the differences raised by the tuna-

dolphin dispute, a large body of literature has emerged.^''
controversy itself has ended, the debate continues. If

of dolphins one time,

it

it

the shrimp ban for sea-turtles

is

was
now;

Even though

the tuna-dolphin

the tuna ban for the protection
it

could be salmon and sharks

^'
See Piritta Sorsa, GATT and Environment: Basic Issues and Some Developing Country Concerns,
International Trade and the Environment 337, 337 (Patrick Low ed., 1992); See also Steve
Chamovitz, Recent Developments: Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT: An Analysis of the Pelly
Amendment on Foreign Environmental Practices, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 75 757 ( 994).

in

1

^^

See generally Reinstein, supra note

views. Id.

at

" See

Id. at

Numerous

4, at

239. See also

Reinstein's

and the Environment: The PPMs Debate in SUSTAINABLE
Thomas J. Schoenbaum's Comment on the views expressed by

249.

contributions in books and scholarly journals have been published on the subject.

leading book that gives a comprehensive analysis

is

ESTY,

supra note

1;

A

see also SUSTAINABLE

Trade And the Environment: Law, Economics, And Policy (D. Zaelke
1993)[hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT]. The leading commentator on the environmental

Development supra
,

side, Steve

subject.

Comment on

generally Candice Stevens, Trade

Candice Stevens.

et al eds.,

See also Laura Campbell's

1

233.

Development, supra note

'"

16, at 223.

,

note 4

;

Chamovitz and on

the trade side, Jagdish

Bhagwati have contributed numerous

articles

on the

See Steve Chamovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL

J. 459 (1994)[hereinafter Defogging the debate\,C):\?imo\\X.z, supra note 31; Steve Chamovitz, A
Taxonomy of Environmental Trade Measures, 6 GEO. iNT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1993)[hereinafter,'^ Taxonomy];
Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and Environment: The False Conflict? in TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra at
159 (1993). The above list is not exhaustive.

iNT'L L.

5

.

8

A

yet another time.^^

GATT

believe that

formation of a

new

"continuing search for reconcihation"

is

is

Some commentators

made.^^

not suited to address environmental concems;^^ they advocate the

institution

such as the Global Environmental Organization (GEO); or a

World Environmental Organization (WEO);^* or General Agreement on
(GATE).^''

they

Some

suggest

others believe that reconciliation

cures"

"institutional

possible within the

is

the Environment

GATT

framework;

an amendment,''^ or a waiver incorporating

like

Without doubt, these approaches deserve merit and need

environmental concerns."*'

to

be

pursued. Regrettably, they are not practicable. Negotiations between parties of a multilateral

agreement

is

a tedious and

cumbersome

process.

requires the political will of atleast two-thirds of

" See Environment: Under Attack:
TIME p. 59 (Aug. 11, 1997).

It's

And amendment
its

or waiver of the

members. This

is

not

GATT

feasible.'*-

The

Humans, Not Sharks, Who Are Nature's Most Fearsome

Predators,

^*

^

Mich.

''

See Schoenbaum, supra note

Jeffrey L. Dunhoff, Institutional Misfits:
Int'L. L.

J.

8.

environmental

The

GA TT,

The ICJ & Trade-Environment Disputes

1043, 1071 (1994). Dunhoff argues that the

interests.

Where

conflict exists,

GATT practice

GATT

1

"has no mandate to advance

invariably subordinates environmental interests

to trade interests." Id.

^*

^'

ESTY, supra note

1

,

at

230-3

1

Edith B. Weiss, Environmental Equity:

Sustainable Development, supra note
''°

Indeed the

GATT Panels have

Tuna Panel, supra note
this type

(such as the

1

1,

para. 6.3.

4, at

The Imperative for the Twenty-First Century,

indicated their preference for an

"If the Contracting Parties

US tuna embargo)

in

26.

in particular

were

circumstances,

it

amendment

process. See e.g.. First

to decide to permit trade

measures of

would therefore be preferable

for

them

XX, but by amending or supplementing" the GATT. Id. Likewise, other
to
commentators have suggested an amendment approach. See Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT:
Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397,402
do so not by interpreting

(1994)(argues that there

is

an urgent need of amendment or supplementation of GATT to allow environmental

concerns without violating
""

article

GATT).

Douglas Jake Caldwell, International Environmental Agreements and the

Potential Conflict

and the Role of a GATT "Waiver" Resolution,

"In the current international climate, the

GATT

18

Md.

J.

GA TT: An Analysis of the

Int'L&TRADE

173, 187-197(1994).

waiver represents the most practical method of securing

immediately the legitimate environmental protection goals of the international environmental agreements."
''^

Id.

See Dunhoff, supra note 37, at 1066-71. Dunhoff examines each of the "institutional cures":
amending the GATT, utilizing the GATT waiver provision and negotiating a separate "environmental code"

9
non-feasibility of such approaches

"environment" in Article
the

GATT

till

today, there

Recognizing

environment

XX/^

that

issues, the

is

and concludes
*^

that

See

The

1067.

In the

member
"positive"

is

include the term

environment.""*'*

an important means to

States created the

reconcile trade and

Committee on Trade
wdfcome.

harmonization efforts are
its

action

is slow."*^

proposed cures are satisfactory."

.

to

"[I]n 1991, the Negotiating

Group on

If the

and

The

march of law

at

Id.

GATT Articles rejected a suggestion that

the phrase "the environment" to Article XX(b)." Id.

^ Schoenbaum,
^^

.

failure

troubling to notice that from the date of formation of

promising/^ Regrettably,

.

by the

no "general agreement on the

WTO

"none of the

id. at

would have added

is

illustrated

harmonization

Environment (CTE)/^
Committee's agenda

It is

is

supra note

8, at

270.

Marrakesh Conference meeting on April

14, 1994, the

GATT Contracting Parties adopted

a Ministerial Decision formally establishing the Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE). Trade and

Environment,
^^

GATT Ministerial

See generally Jennifer Schultz, The

Environmental Reform, 89 AM.

Environment under the
'•^

Decision of 14 Apr. 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994).

J.

GA TT/WTO Committee on

Trade and the Environment— Toward

INT'L L. 423, 438(1995). "[C]reation of the

Committee on Trade and the

WTO was a welcome relief to environmentalists". Id.

The terms of reference of Committee on Trade and Envirormient (CTE) reads

(a) to identify the relationship

in part:

between trade measures and environmental measures,

in

order to

promote sustainable development;
(b) to

make

appropriate recommendation on whether any modifications of the provisions of the

multilateral trading system are required, compatible with the open, equitable

and nondiscriminatory

nature of the system, as in regards, in particular:
-the

need for rules to enhance positive interaction between trade and environmental measures, for the

promotion of sustainable development, with special consideration to the needs of developing
countries, in particular those of the least developed
-the avoidance

to ensure the responsiveness
in

among them; and

of protectionist trade measures, and the adherence to effective muhilateral disciplines

Agenda 21 and

of the multilateral trading system

to

the Rio Declaration, in particular Principle 12;

environmental objectives

set forth

and

-the surveillance of trade measures used for environmental purposes, of trade-related aspects of

environmental measures which have significant trade effects, and of effective implementation of the
multilateral disciplines governing those measures.

Taken from Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. Probs. 175, 180, n.lO (1996).
"*

Since

its

inception, the

CTE

has had four meetings: February 16, 1995; April

6,

1995; June 21,

The Singapore Conference was on December 13, 1996. See Kelly Jude Hunt, International
Environmental Agreements in Conflict with GATT— Greening GATT after the Uruguay Round Agreement, 30
iNT'L Law 163, 180-81 (1996). Schoenbaum, supra note 8, at 269. Referring to the Singapore Conference,
Schoenbaum points out that it "does little to inspire confidence that the CTE will be able to formulate concrete
1995.

10
the legislative level does not proceed at the expected pace, "negative harmonization" can

some

A "realistic"

gaps.

fill

approach would be to use a "panel-created" doctrine that balances

the interests of trade and environment.'*'

This thesis argues that the "panel-created" doctrine should be
approach.'*^

The success of such an approach

rule of reason

very evident from the experience of the

is

European Court of Justice and the United States Supreme
level

a

In both jurisdictions, the

Court.^'

of protection to the environment desired were not explicitly maintained. Both have

developed legal bases to overcome the perceived 'inadequacies' of the law and have made
attempts to reconcile the two policy commitments; in particular, the European Court of
Justice has

been creative

In chapter

II,

in the 'negative

harmonization' process."

an analysis of the tuna-dolphin decisions

have interpreted the Article

that the tuna-ban panels

XX

is

made.

It

will be

shown

exceptions narrowly. This has

created an imbalance between trade and the environment rendering the reconciliation of the

two goals rather

WTO

the

May

difficult.

However,

in a related

development, the United States appealed

Panel Report on the Reformulated Gasoline^^ case decision. In

20, 1996, the Appellate

Body

rejected

Reformulated Gasoline case with respect

Schoenbaum

points out that

recommendations

"does

little

to Article

XX(g) and

to inspire confidence that the

CTE

the Panel Report of the

Article

will

decision on

XX of the G ATT as

be able to formulate concrete

for reconciling the important issues at stake." Id.

"'

Philip

^'

See chapter

M. Nichols, Trade without

is

values,

90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 658, 714-719 (1996).

III, infra.

" Paul Craig
"Harmonization

it

some conclusions of

its

&

Grainne De Burca, EC Law: Text, Cases, And Materials, 586

essentially negative

and deregulatory

in

the sense that the result

is

(1995).

that national rules are

held not to apply. This can be contrasted with 'positive harmonization' which results from the promulgation

of

.

.

.

legislative measures, stipulating

" Report of

which rules can apply across

the Panel in United States

-

the

.

.

.[country] as a whole." Id.

Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline

(Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like Products of National Origin) 35 LL.M. 274 (1996)[hereinafter the

Reformulated Gasoline case].

11

To be

a whole. ^"^

jurisprudence.
to close the

A

gap

this decision

change

in the

that exists

Body

decision

is

a turning point in the

GATT

landscape has occurred and the decision could be expected

between trade and the environment. Chapter

II

also addresses

how

impacts the resolution of the trade and environment conflicts.

In chapter

examined.

sure, the Appellate

It is

the jurisprudence of the United States and the

III.

shown

that they

European Union

is

have created a rule of reason approach to balance the

contending goals of trade and the environment. However, the study reveals that the language

of the European Union Treaty provisions and the

GATT are similar.

Further, the issues that

the European Court confronted while interpreting the key provisions are identical to the

by the

issues faced

GATT.

closely. This examination

is

examined

rule of reason approach has helped the

European

Consequently, the approach of the European Court

shows how the

Court to bring a balance between free flow of commerce and protection of the environment.

As mentioned

above, this thesis proposes that the

WTO Dispute

Settlement

Body

adopt the rule of reason approach to resolve trade and environment issues. Interestingly, an
excellent opportunity to put to test the rule of reason doctrine exists already.
effective

May

1

,

1

Recently,

996, the United States has slapped a ban on the import of shrimp from

India and other Asian countries on the ground that shrimp
detrimental to marine sea-turtles.^^

Predictably, the affected countries have complained

before the World Trade Organization (WTO).^^

^ See Report of the Appellate Body

being harvested in a manner

is

in

To

date, the dispute is undecided.

United States -Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996)[hereinafter the Gasoline Standards case].

" On May

1,

1996, the United States banned shrimp imports from countries which harvested shrimp

without the Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs) and caused danger to the sea-turtles. Earlier, the United States

had imposed shrimp imports on a "shipment-by-shipment"
Island Institute, (Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 13
ruled that the

US

8,

However, on a lawsuit

filed

by the Earth

73, l/17/96),the Court of International Trade

ban on shrimp imports should apply worldwide.

The major shrimp exporters

May

basis.

ITR

BNA

INT'L

TRADE DAILY

are Thailand, India, China, Bangladesh, and Honduras.

BNA

,

Jun. 25, 1997.

iNT'L

TRADE

REP.,

1996.

'*

On

February 25, 1997, a

several other Asia countries.

WTO Panel was established to examine the complaint filed by India, and
yet to decide the dispute. See Overview of the State-of-play of WTO

The Panel

is

12

Chapter IV addresses the issues raised by the above
is

made

to see

analysis.

case
rule

is

how

the

In this regard, the impact of the Appellate Body's decision in the

of reason analysis.

By

this case study,

Finally, chapter

V

embargo

an effort

differences in analyses between the current

is

is

made

GATT analysis

An attempt

US Standards

analyzed under the suggested

to highlight the similarities

and the suggested

and

rule of reason

concludes the thesis.

Disputes, <http://www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin.html> (visited 07/08/97).

25, 1997.

shrimp embargo.

WTO Panel would examine the embargo under the current GATT

also taken into consideration. Further, the

analysis.

US

The Overview

is

upto date as on June

CHAPTER II
THE TUNA-DOLPHIN CASE AND THE GATTAVTO JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Background
In the Eastern Tropical Pacific

Ocean (ETP).

a "unique ecological relationship"

between tuna and dolphins has been long observed.' The commercial fishing industry
exploited this "relationship" by locating dolphins and encircling

the Marine

Mammal

taking/"* the United States

the purse-seine nets.

The

Protection Act^

(MMPA)

which prohibits such

"incidental

imposed a ban on Mexican tuna and tuna products harvested using

MMPA sought to implement

its

policy through two limbs. First,

the United States controlled and reduced the "incidental" killing of dolphins by
fishing industry.^ Second, the

MMPA had stipulated that in order to access

United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the

'

nets

resulting in high accidental death or "taking" of dolphins.

to catch the tuna underneath,-

Under

them with purse-seine

I.L.M. 1594, 1598 [hereinafter First

GATT

its

domestic

the U.S. markets

Panel (August 16, 1991), 30

Tuna Panel].

^Id.dX 1598, para 2.2.

'

The Marine Mammal Protection Act, (hereinafter
Stat. 4467 (1990).

MMPA)

P.L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as

amended, 104
"

Taking includes "harassment, hunting, capture,

^

See Section 101(a)(2) of the

MMPA,

dolphins per year, out of which only 250

killing or attempt thereof."

which limited the "incidental"

may belong

killing

See

id.

of dolphins to 20,500

to the coastal dolphin species("Stenella Attenuata")

2750 may be Eastern Spinner dolphin species {Stenella Longirostris").

13

In this regard,

Mexico argued

and
that

.

14

for the tuna

and tuna products, foreign tuna producers fishing

in the

dolphin-safe standards comparable to that of the United States.^
against Mexico, the import ban

was applied

ETP

region must have

In addition to the

embargo

as against other "intermediary" countries that

imported tuna from the "primar>'" embargoed countries. This tuna import ban became the
subject of challenge before the

GATT

in

1991 and 1994.^

The Tuna-ban Panel Reports

B.

In late 1991,

Mexico challenged

the United States'

ban before the GATT. Mexico

argued that the import ban was a quantitative restriction contrary to Article XI of the GATT.*
It

argued that by banning tuna from a specific geographic area, namely the ETP, the United

States violated Article XIII
area.^

which condemns discrimination based on a specific geographic

Furthermore, Mexico alleged that United States also violated the national treatment

obligation. '° Claiming

that

domestic tuna and imported tuna are

the species of dolphins explicitly mentioned

by the

under the CITES. First Tuna Panel, supra note

''

yellowfm

program regulating

average rate of such taking

were required
rate

supra note

3.

In

MMPA

Mexico

were neither considered threatened or extinct

1599, para. 2.4.

MMPA

Section 101(a)(2)(B) of the

provides that "importation of

Commerce finds that (i) the government of the harvesting
taking of marine mammals by vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable
by United States vessels. " Id. To meet the comparable standard, countries

show

to

that their dolphin-take

of the United States vessels operating
'

at

products,

prohibited unless the Secretary of

is

countr>' has a
to the

MMPA,

See

1,

'like'

was "not

in the

ETP

in

excess of

1

.25 times the average incidental taking

during the same period."

Id.

March, 1992, the European Economic Community (now European Union) joined by the Kingdom

of Netherlands challenged the "intermediary embargo" as violative of GATT obligations. Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (June 1994)[hereinafter Second

tuna panel]

*

First

'M

Tuna Panel, supra note

at

1602, para. 3.14.

'"/c?. at

1603, para. 3.16.

1,

at

1616, para. 5.8.

15

argued that the United States measures under the

was

MMPA,

whose

stated legislative purpose

to protect dolphins, does not affect tuna as a product; consequently, the

ban was a violation of the
treatment" than the

US tuna."

GATT

obligation to accord

Mexican tuna "no

In the United States' view, the tuna

were laws and regulations covered under Article

restriction, but

the fact that foreign tuna producers

On

United States producers.'-

III

of the

III

applies to products, the

III.

The Panel concluded

violated the Article

Though the

not valid by underscoring
that

of the

were treated more

MMPA measures.'^ However, the Panel

MMPA measures which does not cover

which

it

is

harvested,

that the direct import prohibition

XI obligations of the United

since the

Further, the United

the contrary, foreign tuna producers

the product tuna as such, but the process by
Article

is

GATT,

had an additional margin of 25 percent over

favorably than their domestic counterparts under the

found that since Article

argument

less favorable

ban was not a quantitative

MMPA measures were enforced at the time or point of importation.
States argued that the "no less favorable treatment"

Mexican tuna-

would not

fall

under

of tuna and tuna products

States.'''

GATT Panels touched many aspects of the GATT provisions, for the purpose

of this analysis, their findings with regard to the environmental exceptions under Article
are important.

the

GATT

To determine the GATT-consistency of

a measure at issue under Article

Panels typically subject the challenged measure to a three step analysis.

'-Id. at

1602-3, paras.3.18- 3.20.

''Id. at

1603, para. 3.20.

'"/J. at

1618, para. 5.18.

XX
XX,

First,

16

the Panel

makes

environmental target outside the regulating

examines

measures

the

if

requirements; and third,
Article

XX.

1.

What
It is

In particular, the conservation of an

a conservation policy analysis.

it

Second, the Panel

the requirements under Article

satisfy

looks to see

state is not excepted.

if the

measure

satisfies the

XX

(b)

and

(g)

preambular conditions of

are "necessary" Measures

established that Article

human, animal or plant

XX(b) can justify a measure

that seeks to protect the

or health within the borders of the regulating

life

measures that seek to protect targets beyond the regulating

State.'''

States' territories

Whether

would

fall

within the meaning of "necessary" was one of the basic questions raised by the tuna-dolphin
dispute.

The

GATT Panel

noted that the text of Article XX(b) does not explicitly answer the

question whether a contracting party could take measures "necessary" to protect the

environment outside

its

jurisdiction.'^

analysis, a purpose analysis

parties

on the
In

its

Consequently, the Panel resorted to a historical

and an analysis of the interpretive consequences urged by the

GATT as a whole.

historical analysis, the Panel noticed that Article

XX(b)

in its present

form read

similar to Article 32(b) of the Draft Charter of the International Trade Organization(ITO).
In the process

which

of its revision, a proviso was added by the

read: "For the purpose of protecting

'^

See

e.g.,

Panel Report on Thailand

Cigarettes, adopted 7
justified

its

November

1990,

regulation under the Article

BISD

XX

-

human, animal or plant

Restrictions on Importation

First

Tuna Panel, supra note

1,

exceptions.

at

life

or health, if

of and Internal Taxes on

37S/200[hereinafter Thai Cigarettes case](where Thailand

The

GATT Panel rejected the claims of Thailand on

other grounds).

'^

New York Draft to the ITO charter,

1619, para. 5.24.

.
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corresponding domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist

restrictions

would seem superfluous. Accordingly,

dropped by the drafters as "unnecessary."'^ From

this the

all

the

parties to

added proviso was

Panel inferred that Article XX(b)

exception was to be applied within one's jurisdiction.'^ Further, in

Panel noted that

importing

the

were intended to be applied domestically, requiring

country."'^ If the measures

impose domestic

in

'purpose' analysis, the

its

challenged measures are subject to the conditions against misuse.

It

pointed out that the purpose of the exceptions was to allow contracting parties to pursue their

"/J.

XX(d) uses

Similar to Article XX(b), Article

overriding public policy goaIs."°

the term

at para. 5.26.

''Id

at

^'^Id

1620, para 5.26.

The Panel noticed

that before Article

XX(b) came

form, the exception read: "For the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant

domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist
proposal was introduced
Charter of the

ITO

in the

life

read: "Nothing in

restricted to

or health."

Id.

the importing country." Id.

New York Draft to the ITO

Charter.

Id.

Earlier, the

to be read in

or health,
at

if

present

its

corresponding

1619, para. 5.26. This

United States

in the

Draft

Chapter IV [on commercial policy] of this Charter shall be construed to

prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
or plant

in

life

Member of measures;

.

.

.

(b) necessary to protect

human, animal

For a criticism of the Panel's analysis and conclusion that trade measures are

domestic application, see Belinda Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental

66 TEMP. L. REV. 751 (1993). Anderson

on the Article 4 of the Convention on
wording to Art. XX of the GATT. During
its debate, the United States had referred to the jurisdictional scope of some of its laws in existence at that point
in time. She points out that nevertheless, the Convention participants did not narrow the exception. Thus, a

Protection Policy,

Suppression of Import and Export Prohibitions, which

"reasonable conclusion" could

is

relies

similar in

be drawn that the participants shared the view of the United States;

consequently, extra-territorial conservation efforts should be legitimately excepted.
H. Jackson, World Trade Rules

49 Wash.

& Lee

L.

and Environmental Policies: Interdependent Goals

/li.

at

758-60. But see John

or Irreconcilable Conflict?

Rev. 1221, 1241 (1992)(preparatory documents of treaties constitute a secondary means
its reliance is circumscribed). Moreover, Anderson relies on a historical "omission"

of treaty interpretation; thus
to reach her conclusion.

Anderson, supra, 758-60. Indeed,

See First Tuna Panel, supra note
^°

First

Tuna Panel, supra note

1,

at

was done by

the tuna-ban Panel in

its

analysis.

1692, para. 5.27. See also Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15.

Thailand had restricted imports of cigarettes and subject

even though the Panel accepted

this

1

that

it

to internal taxes.

"smoking constituted a serious

measures to reduce the consumption of cigarettes

fell

risk to

With regard

human

to Article

XX (g),

health and that consequently

within the scope of article XX(g),"

id. at

222-23, para.

18

Previous

"necessary."

GATT

Panels had ruled under the Article

measure becomes "necessary,"

if alternative

and inconsistent measures

reasonably employed were not available."' Indeed,
available" then, a country should

However, since

trade-restrictive

employ

measures

XX(d) context

if

the least

such a measure

GATT

is

inconsistent alternative.

risk inconsistency with

a "consequences" test of Article XX(b). While

the United States pressed for a broad interpretation.

that could be

"not reasonably

GATT obligations,

inconsistent measure are allowed only to the extent they are unavoidable.-^

made

that a

Then

Mexico urged a narrow

The consequences of

-^

such

the Panel

interpretation,

the United States'

approach, the Panel viewed, would lead to unilateralism where each contracting party could
"unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies
parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights"-"*

from which other contracting
under the

GATT.

Further, the

Panel reiterated that since the United States measures could not, by themselves, achieve their
intended effect, but depended on the changes in policies of other countries, they are not
"necessary" measures. Furthermore, assuming arguendo, that Article

XX(b) applied

outside

the jurisdiction of the United States, the Panel pointed out that the "necessary" conditions

would not be

satisfied unless the

United States had "exhausted

72, the Panel held that other less restrictive measures

all

options reasonably

were available and consequently,

it

did not satisfy the

"necessary" criterion under Article XX(b), Id

-'

Second Tuna Pane!, supra note

~ Id.

at

7, at

896.

896, para. 5.34, citing Report of the Panel on United States

-

Section 337 of the Tariff Act

of 1930, adopted 7 November 1989, L/6439, 365/345, 392. para. 5.26 [hereinafter 5ecr/o« 357 case]. See also
Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15.
^^

Second Tuna Panel, supra note

^^

First

Tuna Panel, supra note

1,

7, at

at

896.

1620, para. 5.27.
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available to

Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the United States' measures were

it."-'

inconsistent under Article

Article

2.

XX(b) of the GATT.

XX(g)

Unlike Article XX(b) which clearly specifies the targets for conservation namely

human, animal or plant
This

is

life

or health. Article

the starting point for any Article

XX(g) covers "exhaustible

XX(g)

analysis. This has

whether the target chosen by the regulating party

Once

questioned.

this is fixed, the

do not deviate from the
regulating party

may

target.

second purpose

Thus

two purposes.

worthy of conservation

is

First,

efforts

is

to ensure that the conservation efforts

some product

A

not use measures regulating product

must necessarily focus on the product
Generally, the

if

is

natural resources."

that is sought to

is

B

the target of conservation, the
for

its

conservation strategy.

It

be conserved.

GATT Panels have agreed on the targets of conservation chosen by the

GATT

regulating countries.-^ However, the

Panels have insisted that a contracting party

cannot seek to protect resources that are beyond their borders.-^

In the tuna-ban case, the

United States insisted that Article XX(g) has application outside domestic borders. The tuna-

ban Panels gave a negative answer. In

their analysis, the

Panels immediately conceded that

dolphins are "exhaustible natural resources."-^ Unlike Article XX(b) which uses the term

-Ud.

'*

supra note
^^

^^

See
7;

e.g.,

Thai Cigarettes case, supra note 15; First Tuna Panel, supra note

Reformulated Gasoline case,

See

e.g.,

infra.

Thai Cigarettes case, supra note

Second Tuna Panel, supra note

7, at

1

5.

890, para. 5.11.

1

;

Second Tuna Panel,

20
"necessary," Article

XX(g) poses

interpretative

problems of the terms "relating

to"

and

"in

conjunction with domestic production or consumption."
3.

Meaning

of the

Terms

'relating to'

and

'in

conjunction with'

Previous Panels had concluded that "relating to" and "in conjunction with" should

be taken

to

mean

"primarily aimed" at the conservation of the resource and

its

restrictions

on consumption or production within the invoking country.'^ Further, the tuna-ban Panel
also noted that previous Panels have devised the "purpose"
the "primarily

aimed

at" requirement.^^

and

"effects" test to determine

In other words, not only should a

measure have the

"purpose" of conserving an exhaustible natural resource, but also capable of producing the
desired effect of conservation. Admittedly, the purpose of the United States measure

dolphin protection. However,

its

measures banned any tuna, regardless of whether they

were caught using "dolphin-safe" fishing techniques or

not.

Moreover, a measure whose

effectiveness depended on whether the exporting country changed
is

ineffective.

Such

ineffective

conservation. Accordingly, the

not satisfy the "relating to"

'^

Id. at

was

its

policies or practices

measures could not possibly further the "purpose" of the

GATT Panel concluded that the United

test.^'

Thus

if

States measures does

dolphins are the conservation target, a measure

892, para. 5.21. See United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and

Tuna Products from

Canada, Feb. 22, 1982, Gatt B.I.S.D. (29th Supp., 1982); Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of
Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, Gait B.I.S.D. (35th Supp. 1988)[hereinafter Unprocessed
herring case]; In the Matter of Canada's Landing Requirement for the Pacific Coast Salmon and Herring,
Panel No.

CDA-89- 1807-01 (OCT.

McDonald, Greening the

16, 1989), available in LEXIS, Itrade Library,

GA TT: Harmonizing Free

Order, 23 Envtl. L. 397, 445-46 (1993).

'°

^'

Second Tuna Panel, supra note
Id

at

893.

7, at

USCFTA

file

Trade and Environmental Protection

892.

;

see also Janet

in the

New World

21

regulating tuna

products

is

is

not acceptable.

banning import of tuna and tuna

not "primarily aimed at" conservation of dolphins. Allowing trade restrictions

on any product non-related
to protectionism

4.

Put another way,

The

to the target

of conservation could lead

to unilateralism

and lead

of one's domestic industries.

Jurisdiction of the Target

Without doubt, dolphins are conservable. However, the location of the dolphins

becomes an arguable
the world or

is it

issue.

Can

a regulating State protect dolphins that exist

restricted to protecting the species within

(now European Union) and

its

the Netherlands claimed that

anywhere

in

own jurisdiction? The EEC

on an "object and purpose"

interpretation of Article XX(g), the natural resource could not be located outside the

jurisdiction of the regulating country.

XX(g), arguing

that

it

The United

places no limitation

on the jurisdiction or location of the "exhaustible

natural resource" to be conserved.^- Indeed,
interpretation that Article

The Panel observed
Article

XX(g),

its

XX(g) does not

States urged a literal reading of Article

the Panel agreed with the United States'

indicate as to the location of the natural resource.

that other than placing explicit

text does not specify the "nature

preambular limitations on the use of

and precise scope" of the exception. The

Panel reasoned that on an examination of other paragraphs under Article
Article

XX(e)

relating to prison labor,

are "proscribed in an absolute

ban Panel had relied

"M
''Id.

at

in part to

891, para. 5.14.

it

XX,

in particular

could not be said that "extra-territorial" measures

manner."" The "preparatory works", on which the

first

tuna-

conclude that Article XX(g) applied to resources within one's

22
jurisdiction had far less

appeal to the second tuna-ban Panel.

Thus,

it

concluded that

it

"could see no valid reason to support the conclusion" that Article XX(g) applies only to
policies related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources located within the
territory

of regulating party.

It

may

^"^

also be pointed out that in

ban Panels noted

that the

historical analysis

its

term "domestic safeguards under similar conditions exist

importing country" in Article 32(b) of the Draft

"unnecessary."

In

its final

form. Article

context, "domestic safeguards"

or consumption which

is

of Article XX(b), the tuna-

ITO

Charter was omitted by

XX(b) concerns conservation

means some

sort

of restrictions on

similar to the language used in Article

its

it

in the

drafters as

efforts.

Put in

domestic production

XX(g) which says "made

effective in conjunction with domestic production or consumption." If from the fact that the

term was deliberately omitted as "unnecessary", the Panel inferred non-extra-jurisdictional
application of Article XX(b), conversely, the "non-omission" of the

XX(g) could be viewed

as

a provision that Article

above phrase in Article

XX(g) was intended

to

apply extra-

jurisdictionally.

Nevertheless, the

tuna-ban Panels

have rested

their jurisdictional issue

effectiveness of the measure: the presumption being that a

the target of conservation

A

is

within the regulating

measure

state's borders.

is

It

most

on the

effective

when

observed:

country can effectively control the production or consumption of an exhaustible

natural resource only to the extent that the production or consumption
jurisdiction. This suggests Article

'"Mat

892, para. 5.20.

XX(g) was intended

to

is

under

its

permit contracting parties to

23
rendering effective restrictions on production or

take trade measures primarily

consumption within

their jurisdiction/^

Recalling an earlier panel's finding, which observed that

The purpose of including

Article

XX(g)

in the

General Agreement was not to widen

the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the

commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies
aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources^^

would allow measures taken

the tuna-ban Panel emphasized that an interpretation that

force other countries to change their policies
particular, the right

of

would

affect the "balance

of

rights,"

"access to markets" and would seriously impair the

to

in

GATT

framework.
Since both the Panels found that the United States
"essential conditions"

under Article XX(b) and

(g),

it

measures did not

was unnecessary

for

them

satisfy the

to

examine

the preambular restrictions. Nevertheless, the United States claimed that since the preamble
to Article

XX

mentions that "nothing

in this

[GATT] Agreement

shall

be construed to

prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures," Article
constitutes a separate justification in itself.^^

PaneP^ concluded that "Article

The Panel however, following an

earlier

XX

GATT

XX is a limited and conditional exception from obligations

"

First

^^

Unprocessed herring case, supra note 29,

"

First

^*

Section 337 case, supra note 22, at 385, para. 5.9.

Tuna Panel, supra note

Tuna Panel, supra note

1, at

1, at

1621.

at 114, para. 4.6.

1605.
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under other provisions of the General Agreement, and not a positive rule establishing
obligations in

The

C.

itself.""^

CAFE

In 1994. a

Corporate

CAFE

Dispute

GATT

Panel"*^

examined another United

States' regulation called the

Average Fuel Economy Standard (CAFE)'*' and the Gas Guzzler

The

Tax''.-

standard had a "general fleet averaging" and "separate foreign fleet averaging"

scheme. The Gas Guzzler tax was applied on the sales of individual cars that did not meet
the required fuel efficiency.

The former required automobile manufacturers

to

meet

certain

levels of overall fuel efficiency of 27.5 miles per gallon for their entire fleet, while the latter

required that the manufacturers

show

that domestic

and imported cars meet the

efficiency separately, even if they satisfied "general average."

upheld as
the

it

was found non-discriminatory between foreign and domestic

CAFE standard did not pass the scrutiny

of Article

the application of tuna-ban analysis. In order to

CAFE

III.'*"'

examine

if

The

"general average"

'•°

First

1,

at

standard required

XX would excuse the

fleet"

that while

averaging was not

Panel Report on "United States Taxes on Automobiles", 33 I.L.M. 1397 (1994) [hereinafter

15U.S.C. §§2002-2013.

'-

26 U.S.C. §4064.

'^

CAFE

'^5ee/^.

Report, supra note 40,

at

1456-57.

at

was

1619, para. 5.22.

Report].

''

tax

In contrast,

The Panel noted

scheme could be justified, the "separate foreign

Tuna Panel, supra note

cars.'*^

CAFE

Article

standards, the Panel applied the "three step" formula.

"

The Gas Guzzler

fuel

1452.

CAFE

25

compatible with Article XX(g).

As both

the standards—the "general average" and the

"separate foreign fleet" averaging were "inextricably linked," the Panel held that one

More

not be excused while allowing other.
the tuna-ban Panels, the

standard for

Article

CAFE

importantly, representing a clean departure from

Panel observed that in applying the "primarily aimed

XX(g) which would have
was not

"efficiency" of the measure

may

at"

to render effective the measures,"*^ the

crucial for Article

XX(g)

analysis/^

The Reformulated Gasoline Case

D.

It

would seem

Venezuela and Brazil took the above "efficiency" argument a

that

further in their complaint against the United States in the

little

case."*^

The Panel held

for refiners, blenders

that the

Reformulated Gasoline

Gasoline Rule, which established two baseline requirements

and importers of gasoline—individual baseline for domestic producers
producers— were inconsistent under the General

and a tougher

'statutory' baseline for foreign

Agreement.

Notably, the United States justified the Gasoline Rule under the General

Exceptions, namely Article

''

See

'"Id
""

XX (b) and (g).

id.

at

1456.

Report of the Panel

in

United States

-

Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline

(Treatment of Imported Gasoline and Like Products of National Origin) 35 I.L.M. 274

Reformulated Gasoline

easel.

Under the Clean Air Act of 1990,

(

1996)[hereinafter the

the United States passed a regulation titled

"Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline",

known

as the "Gasoline Rule"

whose purpose was

combustion of gasoline manufactured

in

to control to.xic

commonly

and other pollution caused by the

or imported into the United States.

The 'Gasoline Rule' was

WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). The Panel ruled against
the United States. The United States challenged the WTO Panel Report before the Appellate Body of the WTO.
challenged by Venezuela and Brazil before a

Venezuela and Brazil therein argued that the measure must have "some positive conservation
that a
--

measure

is

primarily related to the object of the measure. Report of the Appellate

Body

effort," to

in

hold

United States

Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline 35 I.L.M. 603, 623 (1996)[hereinafter the Gasoline

Standards case]; see infra notes 120 to 134 and accompanying

text.

26
Like the tima-ban Panels,
this Panel's

questions

it

approach was
posed

itself.

this

Panel also applied a three-step analysis. However, that

flawed from the beginning

is

evident from the inappropriate

Thus, in order to examine the Gasoline Rule under Article XX(b).

the Panel framed the question

which

objectives" and instead focused

on the "inconsistent measures" already held invalid under

the Panel's Article

analysis.^* Referring to previous Panels

III

meaning of the term

"necessary,"'*'^

and proceeded

interpretation

clearly ignored the "necessity of the environmental

to

which had interpreted the

the Reformulated Gasoline Panel applied the

examine whether United States could achieve the same

The United

policy goals by less inconsistent alternatives.

States stressed that

other alternatives and, that such alternatives were not "feasible. "^°
rejected the United States'

same

arguments since

it

it

explored

However, the Panel

found that the same policy objectives could

be achieved without discriminating between domestic and foreign gasoline and ruled that
the United States

had

With regard

failed to satisfy the test
to Article

under Article XX(b).^'

XX(g), Venezuela claimed

that "clean air" is not

exhaustible natural resource falling within Article XX(g), because

**

analysis

Reformulated Gasoline case, supra note 47,

which was pointed by the Appellate Body

and the accompanying
^^

in

at

it is

an

a "condition"of air

296. The same flaw occurred

in Article

XX(g)

the United States Standards case. See notes 120 to 127

text.

Section 337 case, supra note 22,

at

para. 5.26; see also, Thai Cigarettes case,

supra note

15,

at para. 75.

'°

Id.

The United

States maintained that "individual baseline" facility could not be extended to foreign

producers "because of (1) the impossibility of determining the refinery of origin for each imported shipment;
(2) the difficulty

for the United States to exercise an enforcement jurisdiction with respect to a foreign

refinery, since the Gasoline

'•

Id. at

298.

Rule required criminal and

civil sanctions in

order to be effective."

Id.
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that

depend on

its

cleanliness.^- Rejecting this distinction, the Panel held that clean air is

The Panel proceeded

exhaustible natural resource.

Rule

satisfied the requirements

In a brief analysis, the Panel

requirements. In

its

of "relating to" and

further to

examine whether the Gasoline

"in conjunction with" of Article XX(g).

found that the Gasoline Rule did not

satisfy the Article

XX(g)

words:

The Panel saw no

direct connection

between

less favorable treatment

gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline, and the

improving

an

air quality in the

United States.

US

of imported
objective of

Indeed, in the view of the Panel, being

consistent with the obligation to provide no less favorable treatment

would not prevent

the attainment of the desired level of conservation of natural resources under the Gasoline

Rule."

GATT Panel Rulings

E.

Implications of

1.

Scope of Article

The

XX

GATT Panels and in particular the tuna-ban Panels,

rephrased the Article

XX(b) and

by

their interpretation,

(g) exceptions. Thus, in effect. Article

XX(b) and

(g)

have

may

be re-written as
".

.

.

.

[NJothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or

enforcement by any contracting party of [any GATT-consistent] measures:
(b) necessary [that are

reasonably available to

least trade-restrictive] to protect

jurisdiction];

"

Id. at

299.

"

Id. at

300.

it,

or in the alternative, measures that are

human, animal or plant

life

or health [within

its

28
(g) relating to ["primarily
if

aimed at"]

the conservation of exhaustible natural resources

such measures are [aimed at primarily rendering effective such measures]

in

conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption.

Such a narrow

interpretation of the exceptions clause of the

criticized. Nevertheless, the

Tuna-ban Panels may not be

GATT has been widely

criticized for expressing '"slippery

One

slope" concerns in their analysis. This has two dimensions.

measures outside the regulating party's jurisdiction; the other

is

is

the application of the

the restrictions based on the

processes by which products are produced. Without doubt, these are legitimate concerns.

The

tuna-ban Panel took a narrow view with respect to both Articles

first

XX (b) and (g),

while the second Panel relaxed the jurisdictional criterion. However, the Panels have erected
a rather

strict test for

inspired measures.

Article

As

XX(b) which

likely will thwart

such, even after the second tuna-ban Panel decision, the application

of an environmental measure outside a country's

commons

is

mean

borders for the protection of global

suspect.

Further, the tuna-ban Panel's interpretation
to

any genuine environmentally

"least-restrictive"^'' is

there are several

of the term "necessary" which

considered problematic.

problems with

this interpretation.

As

Professor

First, the

is

Schoenbaum

term "necessary"

is

taken

notes,^^

part of a

purpose clause whose object includes protection of living things. The "least-restrictive"

^''

5ee Jackson, supra note

19, at 1240. Professor

"necessary" as "least-restrictive" troubling.
restraint"

on the regulating nations,

"it is

He

Jackson does not find the interpretation of the term

points out that though this interpretation "impose[s]

considered important to prevent article

XX

some

from becoming a large

loop hole." Id The "slippery slope" concerns were alluded to by the tuna-ban Panels also.
^^

Thomas

J.

Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing
J. INT'L L. 268, 276 (1997).

Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM.
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interpretation

wrongly places emphasis on measures, rather than on the protection of living

things. Second,

it

is

unsupported by the framer's

intent.

XX(g)

utilized the term "necessary'" to interpret Article

Third, the Panels have wrongly
as well. Fourth,

unnecessary for the Panels to go to the third prong of their
deference to sovereignty issues.

One way

test.

Fifth,

it

to resolve this difficulty is to

it

has

made

gives very

it

little

follow a rule of

reason approach and thereby "lower the threshold" of entry to satisfy the test under Article

XX(g).^^
2.

The

Issue of Process

and Production Methods (PPMs)

The tuna-dolphin controversy
whether trade

restrictions

raised another contemporary issue

-

the issue of

can be imposed on products depending on the way they are

produced. The tuna-ban Panels' decision were not a surprise
decision in the Belgian Family Allowances case."

The

measures that were based on PPMs. Indeed, there are

in

view of a

earlier

Panel

GATT has consistently outlawed the

many

reasons to argue against the use

ofPPMs.'^

''Id

" GATT Panel

Report, BISD, 1952. (A Belgian law levied a charge on foreign goods from a country
whose system of family allowances did not meet Belgian requirements. On challenge, a GATT Panel ruled
that discrimination

see

on the basis of how products are produced

John H. Jackson, World Trade And The

is

not permitted). For a discussion of this case,

LawofGatt

585-86(1969).

For example, see Schoenbaum, Comment on the Paper by Candice Stevens, in SUSTAINABLE
Development And International Law 249 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995)[hereinafter Sustainable
'^

Development]. Schoenbaum refers to at least three reasons; first, "the principle of comparative advantage
upon which trade is based posits that nations should be able to derive benefits from their factor endowments";
second, it would lead to unilateral actions and chaos in world trade; third global harmonization is impracticable
and unwise economically. Id. See also Stevens, supra, at 239. Stevens identifies three primary reasons for
not allowing

PPMs: economic,

political

and environmental.

Id.
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PPMs may
to the

be either product-related PPMs or non-product related PPMs

enviromnent may be caused by both of them.

In the product-related

59

Damage

PPMs.

the

production method changes the characteristics of the product which pollutes or degrades the

environment when

it

is

consumed or

PPMs

other hand, non-product related

environmental degradation

The

trade rules
is

embodied

in

it

to the ''product"

and has as

strongly rooted in the

.

Any

distinction that

characteristics—

is

is

permissible.

concerned with products."" Thus, a key interpretive term

appears sixteen times*^ in the

in other countries.*'

measures which

based on the product itself— that

GATT and not surprisingly so since

I.

the

GATT perspective, the significant criteria for applying

its final

substantive provisions like Article

On

production externalities and causes

a comprehensive framework covering

on products. From the

is tied

imposes

producing country and/or

in the

trade rules provide

restrict trade

used. This imposes consumption externalities.^^

III;2, 111:4

GATT,

the term

Such a

distinction

is

"legal instrument primarily

it

is

~

the "like product"

is

found

in

and other provisions. Even though the term

was not

susceptible to precise definition but

Candice Stevens, Synthesis Report: Trade and Environment: PPM Issues [hereinafter Synthesis
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: PROCESSES AND PRODUCTION METHODS 7 (OECD DOCLTMENTS, 1994)
[hereinafter Oecd DOCUMENTS].
^'

Report] in

related

*°

Id

at 8.

^'

Id.

Stevens identifies four types of environmental problems that

PPMs. They

are:

may be caused by

the non-product

Transboundary pollution; migratory species and shared living resources; global

environmental concerns; and, local environmental concerns.

" Jackson, supra

note 57,

at

Id.

259.

" See 1970 WORKING PARTY REPORT ON BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS
1970, BISD 18S/97, 102, para. 18 [hereinafter WORKING Party Report].

1/3464, adopted

on 2 December

31

was

left to

the issue.

be decided on a case-by-case basis. ^^ Several

However, the

criteria

by which a product

the physical characteristics of the product

by some

Member

States

generally been rejected.

include

to

is

GATT Panels have grappled

a like or unlike product

is

with

Hmited

to

and does not include the processes. ^^ Attempts

measures based on non-product distinctions have

^^

In addition to the

GATT, two

the Technical Barriers to Trade^^

other agreements deal specifically with product

(TBT) or

the Standards Code, and the

PPMs:

Agreement on the

Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).^^ While the

SPS Agreement

deals with additives, contaminants, toxins and disease-carrying organisms in food, beverages

and

feedstuffs, the Standards

Code covers

all

other products.^^ Both these agreements have

incorporated conditions against misuse. Broadly, for a measure to be satisfied under the

SPS

Agreement, the measure should be "necessary,"™ under which six requirements have been

*'

See

Working Party Report supra

10

November

note 63. See also "Japan - Customs Duties, Taxes and
Wines and Alcoholic Beverages" BISD 34S/83, 15, para. 5.6 (adopted on
,

Labelling Practices on Imported

1

1987).

^ See Reformulated Gasoline
domestic gasoline were

like

case, supra note 47, at 294.

products under Article

of the producers" should be taken into account.
reasoning.

111:4,

On

the question whether imported and

the United States tried to persuade that the "situation

The Reformulated Gasoline Panel

rejected this line of

Id.

^^

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade[hereinafter Standards Code], reprinted in JOHN H.
Jackson et al.. Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of International Economic Relations
149 (3d. ed., 1995). [hereinafter Documents Supplement].
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, reprinted in DOCUMENTS
Supplement, supra note 67, at 121 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
**

^'

Schoenbaum, supra note

™ SPS Agreements, supra

55, at 284.

note 68, Art. 2:1, 2:2.

identified/'

First, the

measures must "not be more trade-restrictive than required

their appropriate level

of

.

.

.

protection."''"

the extent necessary" to protect

must be based on

SPS Agreement urges parties

to

Second, any measure shall be applied "only to

human, animal or plant

"scientific principles"

to achieve

and "sufficient

life

and

health.''^

Third, a measure

scientific evidence."^"*

Fourth, the

base their measures on a risk assessment process "taking into

account" available scientific evidence and economic factors, including the objective of

minimizing negative trade
the chapeau of Article

Fifth, the

effects/'*

XX,

that the

SPS Agreement

measure must not be

repeats the requirements of
"arbitrarily or unjustifiably

discriminate between

members" and must not be a "disguised

trade."'^ Sixth, there is

an obligation

in the interests

at least to

on international

consider adopting intemational

of achieving harmonization. However, a

higher standards. ^^

restriction

member

SPS

standards

State has discretion to set

Likewise, the Standards Code allows measures that do not create

"unnecessary obstacles to intemational trade" and those that are not "more restrictive than
necessary."''^

Indeed, the

TBT

^'

Schoenbaum, supra note 55,

'^

SPS Agreements, supra note

Agreement

at

285.

68, Art. 5:6.

"/c/. at Art. 2:2.

'Ud.

"

Id. at Art. 5.

''/J. at Art. 2:3.

"/(i. at Art. 3.

'*

Standards Code, supra note 67, at Art. 2:2.

uses the term "processes and production

.

methods."

^'^

However,

an effect on the
Thus,

it

is

this

covers only the "processing or production of a product that have

of the product or affect

final characteristics

PPM

reference to non-product related

commitment of the

PPMs~for

would be an

protectionist

PPMs

should be proscribed. Given the potential for abuse of

world

trade."*"

Some view the

it

not hard to imagine

is

it

Different countries have different

differences in productions and processes

comparative advantage.

Absence of any

measures might be taken as reflecting the strong

and non-environmental factors—

"invitation to chaos in

endowments and

extraterritorially.'*'

PPM

GATT members not to allow such measures.

In general, non-product

the

quality or performance."*"^

seen that an elaborate framework has been created for product-related

measures. Moreover, both these Agreements do not apply

policy

its

methods form an

integral part of

differences in environmental standards as a matter

of competitiveness and suggest remedies.*^ Indeed, one principle which has considerable

^'

Stevens, supra note 58, at 24

1

*°

Chakarian, 5Mpra note 59,

115.

*'

Schoenbaum, supra note 58,

'^

Jackson, supra note 57,

at

at

251.

at

74

1

*^

XX
contain a series of exceptions that may be the most
GATT exceptions." Id.

"Article

.

troublesome and most subject to abuse of all

.

.

.

Typically, environmental measures are motivated in part due to concerns that producers in countries

with lower environmental standards get a competitive advantage over producers

environmental standards. The shrimp ban

is

an

illustration

competitiveness concerns. See chapter IV infra. In order to level the playing

appropriate method, and sure enough not

remove

GATT

consistent.

YALE

countries that have higher

L.

J.

field, the

One approach might

the regulatory and legal inefficiencies in the regulating state.

Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102

in

where the United States shrimp industry expressed
use of

PPMs

is

not an

be to look "within" and

See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental

2039, 2049 (1993).

To combat

competitiveness

concerns, rather than use unilateral measures, Stewart advocates that the United States "should seek to reduce
the excessive costs and burdens

administration."

Id.

imposed by

its

exceptionally rigid, legalistic system of environmental law and

34

agreement among the scholars —Polluter Pays
appropriately.

PPMs

Principle*"*

—could address these concerns

Furthermore, environmentalists would point out the non-product related

are targeted against environmentally unsustainable or dirty production

two problems may be encountered.

First, the target

means. Here,

of protection chosen might reflect a

value judgment of the regulating country.**^ This clearly raises sovereignty issues as
for

some

raises

others, issues that are "fundamentally about democracy."*^ Second, the possibility

of banning products unrelated

*"*

it

The

the target "product." Protagonists

would bring an

Polluter Pays Principle "refers to the requirement that the costs of pollution should be borne

by the person or persons responsible
supra note 58,

to

at

for causing the pollution

and the consequential costs." Phillippe Sands,

Representing the international acceptance of the principle. Principle 16 of the Rio

66.

Declaration states: "National authorities should endeavor to promote the internationalization of environmental
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in
principle, bear the cost

of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international

trade and investment." Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,

Adopted June 14, 1992, at the
UN DOC. A/CONF. 151/5
Rev.
reprinted in 3 1 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992) see ESTY, supra note 1, at 176; Schoenbaum, supra note 55,
at 295-98. Pointing out that this is "one economic principle that both ardent environmentalists and committed
free traders can agree on". Professor Schoenbaum argues that the WTO should adopt this Principle. Id. at 296.
See also Steve Chamovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27 CORNELL iNT'L
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero,
1 .,

;

L.J. 459, 505(1994).

*'

See Charles T. Haag, Comment, Legitimizing "Environmental" Legislation Under the

GATT in

CAFE

Panel Report: More Fuel for Protectionists? 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 57, 90 (1995). "For
example, environmentalists in the United States may feel that a South American country's manufacturing

Light of the

practice,

which

kills frogs,

should be stopped.

.

.

.

Should environmentalists

in

one country be allowed under

GATT to restrict trade with the South American country in this example based on
GATT Panels examining analogous situations have said no." /c/ (footnotes omitted).

the

**

William

J.

Snape

&

Naomi

B. Lefkovitz, Searching for

"Process Standards" Getting "Due Process''". 27

CORNELL

iNT'L L.

a concern for frogs?

GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are
J.

777, 781 (1994). "[T]he debate over

PPMs and much of the trade/environment relationship is fundamentally about democracy. Who decides when
and why trade restrictions based on PPMs are appropriate? Citizens of a country speaking through their
legislature? Or an international trade organization, directly accountable only to member governments and
career bureaucrats?"

Id.

Indeed, these are fundamental questions; questions that beg the answer.
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However,

"effectiveness" argument.*^

between good

PPMs

from bad

principled exceptions
is

ones.** Consequently,

may be allowed

measures pursuant

to adopt

under the existing

for the protection

MEAs.

to

its

rules,

it

is

hard to distinguish

use must be limited. However,

some

of truly "global commons." One way

This has been indicated by the tuna-ban Panels, but

has not been clearly articulated.
In defense of the
limitation for the use of

points out that the
product."

;

GATT has

that the

In the analysis

"like

supra note 59,

GATT text does not support any

of "like product," Professor Jackson

used different phrases instead of one term such as the "like

used in different

Stevens,

will

may be argued

commodity"*^, "like merchandise"''"; "like or competitive

"like or directly competitive products"^"

product"''^ are

measures

it

PPM measures.

Terms including

products"^'

^^

PPMs.

articles

at 17.

depend on, among other

things,

of the

;

"directly competitive or substitutable

GATT.

The

interpretation should be

Stevens points out that the "effectiveness of PPM-based trade
1

)

the relative market

power of the country or countries taking

the measure, 2) the type of trade instrument, and 3) the policy package or combination of measures." Id.

**

Schoenbaum,

5«p/-a note 55, at 291.

*'

Art. VI, para. 7,

GATT.

'°

Art. Vll, para. 2,

GATT.

"

Art.

XIX,

para.

1,GATT.

'-

Art.

XIX,

para.

1,GATT.

''

Art. 111:2,

GATT.

harmonized with the purpose of the

Body took

the

Thus,

same view

if

in the

which the term

article in

Japan Shochit^

the purpose of the article

WTO Appellate

case.

more

is

The

appears.*^^

or less determinative of the "likeness" of

the product; and, if the term "like product" has been used sixteen times in the

document when

the framers intended to specify that any regulation or taxes apply only to products,

worth noting the absence of the term
Article

.

.

.

"like

product" in Article

XI also uses the word "measures" when

instituted or

it

extends

its

XX.

XI

application to "other measures
""^^

Arguably, measures

are limited to "products".

is

In contrast, for example.

maintained on the importation or exportation ... of any product

the measures under Article

it

Thus,

may

be

construed as a broader criteria that encompasses trade restrictions even though such measures
are not strictly product related. ^^ If such
in the concept

it

may

imposed are

the intention, the drafters could have brought

of product and specifically limited Article

Put differently,
products,

was

if

the

text

of Article

XX

does not seem to limit the measures solely to

arguably extend to non-products, that

stated in the conditions against misuse.

"^

Jackson, supra note 57,

'^

Japan

-

at

XX measures only to products.

is

processes as well. The limitations

However, as pointed out above, the use

263.

Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report,

WTO Doc. AB

-

1996-2 (Oct. 4

1996) [hereinafter Japan Shochu case]. The concept of "like product" was given a meaning that added
flexibility for

interpretation of same.

As

accordion that stretches and squeezes

the Panel noted, the "likeness" of the product

in different

places as different provisions of the

is

comparable

WTO

to "the

agreement are

applied." Id. at 20.

'*'

"^

Emphasis added.
5ee eg, Japan-Trade

in

Semi-Conductors,

May 4,

1988,

GATT BISD

1

16 (35th Supp. 1989).

The

Panel interpreted the term "measures" to "refer not only to laws and regulations, but also, more broadly, even
to

nonmandatory government involvement." Schoenbaum, supra no\Q

of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb.

XI "measures"

7,

1984,

GATT BISD

as one excluding "internal requirements" that

fall

5A, dXllli. Canada-Administration

140 (30th Supp. 1984)(interpreting Article

under Article

III).

.
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of

PPMs

ought to be limited to domestic enviromnents.

Its

use in foreign environments

is

problematic.

Rather than pursue the PPMs,

member

States

alternative

Solutions suggested include: "(1)

There are no dearth of alternatives.

approaches.

must seriously pursue

international environmental agreements, (2) environmental

management systems,

(3) eco-

labelling, (4) the "polluter pays" principle and, (5) investment standards."*^*
3.

Unilateral

Trade Measures

as a Conservation Policy

Closely tied with the issue of PPMs

be allowed.

It

by the United

was seen

the issue of whether unilateral measures can

that both tuna-ban Panels

have rejected use of unilateral measures

Though some commentators have attempted

States.

"unilateral action"^^

is

and distinguish

it

from

"extra-territorial jurisdiction"

to define
'°°

action,

what
it

is

is

not

relevant for the purpose of our analysis. Indeed, the tuna-ban and subsequent Panels have

used the term "extra-jurisdictional" as opposed to "extra-territorial" which

'*

Schoenbaum, supra note

"

"Unilateral action"

secure a policy goal set by

its

means

state that unilaterally

a nation state's use of
political process."

its

it is

a "multilateral action."

imposes trade measures for

administrative and enforcement agencies to

Anderson, supra note

the "use of their administrative

goal set in an international forum"

considered

55, at 291

domestic

two or more nations coordinate

is

19, at

754. In contrast,

and enforcement agencies

However, Anderson agrees

Id.

extra-territorial

when

to secure a policy

environmental protection

that the "nation

is

the "unilateral

actor." Id.

'°°

Anderson, supra note

enforcement authority beyond
it

its

19, at 755.

exercises "extraterritorial jurisdiction."

extraterritorial ramifications.

command
results

"When

borders, either over

a nation state exercises
its

Of course, any

However, the important

citizens

its

legislative, adjudicative, or

of other countries or over

its

own

nationals,

trade regulation affects trade partners and, thus, has

distinction

is

that exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction

or compel results beyond nation state's borders, but trade measures merely induce or influence

beyond

its

borders."

Id.

38

A

"salutary." '°'

measure

bilateral/multilateral issue

that is predicated

and seeking

to

on the poHcy of a single actor

change other

actors' policy in line

with

in a

own

its

is

not well taken. '°" Even in the era of compromised sovereignty, unilateral actions must be

remain proscribed. In as

much

as

it

can be used

effective, unfortunately, unilateral actions

is

variously depending on the perceptions of the user.'°^

It

can be pressed forward by interest

groups which want freer trade and open markets, or by interest groups which seek to protect
their

domestic industries. '^'^

It

commentators view the issue as not whether

'°'

Schoenbaum, supra note

extraterritorial

unilateral actions should

55, at 280. "[TJhe Tuna/Dolphin

and extrajurisdictional application of

"extra-territorial"

Some

could be used for environmental concetfAs.

article

XX."

Id.

be allowed, but rather

panel distinguished between

II

Professor

Schoenbaum

believes that

measures are allowable under the norms of international law, but not "extra-jurisdictional"

measures; and thus, the Panel's conclusion

Chamovitz, The Environment

vs.

is

For a contrary view, see Steve

"essentially correct." Id.

Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL. L. 475, 496-97 (1993).

"[T]he panel did not offer any definition of an extrajurisdictional offense, even though the panel apparently

Moreover, the Panel's argument based on 1988

invented this term."

evidence

is

'°^

17 Mich.

unpersuasive.

Douglas

J.

Caldwell

& David A.

INT'L L. 563 (1996). "If past

J.

GATT/WTO

GATT Panel

rather than

on

historical

Id.

Wirth, Trade
is

and the Environment: Equilibrium or Imbalance?
far more likely to inspire

any guide, unilateral measures are

dispute settlement challenges than multilateral environmental protection efforts

.

.

.

and no

national measure taken pursuant to a multilateral environmental agreement has ever been challenged in the

GATT/WTO."
'°^

Id.

Id. at

at

574 (footnotes omitted).

574.

"[W]hat one perceives as unilateralism can well be interpreted as leadership by

another."

'"''

The use of

"section 301" of the United States trade law

is

a

good example.

It

has been used

frequently against "other countries in order to influence their policies and/or practices." Reinstein, supra note
58, at 223.

'°^

See generally Gerald Brooks, Environmental Economics and International Trade: An Adaptive

Approach. 5 GEO. iNT'L Envtl. L. Rev. 277 (1993). "Section 301.
advancing environmental objectives and competitiveness concerns."
.

301 are unilateral measures that
a

GATT determination",

.

is

the

Id. at

.

.

.

most useful [instrument] for

303. Brooks agrees that "section

may be subject to challenges under the GATT. However, unless defeated by
may be pursued. Id. Such an approach would undermine and weaken the

section 301

system. Besides, the approach ignores numerous other issues such as 'sovereignty', equity and the

like.

under what circumstances should they be allowed. '°^ The key problem

good from the bad.

Its

lies in

determining the

frequent use reflects the existence of a power-oriented system rather

than a rule-oriented regime'"' and erodes the credibility of the system and weakens

it

in the

'°^

long run.

However, unilateralism

is

not without

its virtues."^''

Even commentators who

advocate a balanced approach to the trade/environment conflict agree that
altematives do not

work

as expected, then as a last resort,

member

states

unilateralism" "° or "creative illegalit}'."'" Indeed, at the very least, a

strongly
if

other

could use "creative

measure should not be

See Edith Brown Weiss, Environment and Trade as Partners in Sustainable Development: A
Commentary. 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 733 (1992); see also Anderson, supra note 19, at 753; Schoenbaum,
supra note 55 at 299-30 David A. Wirth, The International Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal
States: How Close A Fit:' 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1392 (1992).
'"^

1

;

See John H. JacKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE Gatt System 49-54 (1994); Schoenbaum, Free
International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict? 86 AM. J. iNT'L L. 700, 723
'°^

(1992). "[I]f unilateral trade restriction

combat

were permitted

manner of national socioeconomic

all

for environmental reasons, they could also be used to

policies.

Permitting such actions would reduce international

trade to a power-based regime." Id.

108

See McDonald, supra note 29,

"^

Jackson, supra note

107, at 5

1

at

.

468-69.

Professor Jackson acknowledges that unilateral actions could be
patently unfair or bad policy" or "because the current

useful in situations where the "international

'rule' is

international rule-making process

when "reform of the

and national

worked

is

institutional

faulty" or

rule

is

badly needed, but the international

system for some reason makes the reform impossible."

the US's departure from the "currency par value system of the

exchange

"floating
rightfully

is

rates"

acknowledges

system and leaves

it

advocated for decades by leading economists."

that allowing such "stimulating

weakened.

Id.

See also ESTY,

Id. at

5

IMF" which
Id.

1

.

One

case where this

eventually lead to the

However, Professor Jackson

improvements" of a docile system undermines the

supra note

1,

at

144.

"The

intrinsic difficulty

of

making and the lack of existing institutional structures for effective international
environmental policymaking
makes unilateral action a necessary, if unfortunate, policy option in some

multilateral decision

.

circumstances."
"°

.

.

Id.

Schoenbaum, supra note

55, at 299.

justifications for "creative" unilateral action." First

Professor
is

Schoenbaum

points out "atleast

the "doctrine of opposability"

two

which helps

theoretical

"clarify grey

areas" and serves as a catalyst and "an important part of the international law "legislative" process." Second,

40
dismissed merely because

it is

Regrettably however, unilateral actions

unilaterally pursued.

have typically been the prerogative of developed countries because

strength and

the

effectiveness of trade restrictions rests largely on the economic and market power.""
targets of such unilateral action are usually the developing countries.

north-south issues,"^

it

also raises issues of equity

between trading

of the current debate, perhaps the most troubling factor

is

The

Besides raising the

partners. In the context

the unilateral determination of

production standards to be adopted or used by exporting countries. The tuna-dolphin and the

would argue

that production

of countries."'*

Nevertheless,

turtle-shrimp disputes are illustrative. Protagonists of free trade

methods

form

part

of the

comparative

advantage

environmentalists have a valid argument in that they insist not on a particular method of
production; rather they urge production methods that are environmentally sustainable. In
practice however, the unilateral actor

compels the use of similar production technologies by

other countries."^ Further, the "urgency" of the targeted problem

unilateral act

may

be justified as a "countermeasure."

'"McDonald, 5upra note

is

presumed."^

Id.

29, at 468-69.

"- Stevens, supra note 59, at 17.

"^

See generally Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment: Perspectives of Developing Countries
Unep/Trade and the Environment <http://www.unep.ch/t&e/epoc.html> (visited 03/26/96).
"•^

For

e.g.,

see Jackson, supra note 19,

"^ For example, in the

at

in

1244.

shrimp ban dispute, see chapter IV,

harvesting nations to use Turtle Excluder Devices (TEDs).

infra, the

The TEDs

United States expects

are used

by the

US

all

shrimp

shrimp fishing

industry.

"'5ee Anderson, supra note
the international

community

19, at 753.

"[Tjhe urgency of global ecological problems has compelled

to recognize that unilateral action in the

global paralysis." In most cases, the urgency of the problem
the regulating country to prove that there

is

is

form of trade measure

is

preferable to

presumed. This should be avoided by

letting

urgency. For example, reliance on international agreements such

41

To be
sustainabihty

the better approach to persuade countries to adopt environment

sure,

is

trade "carrots" rather than trade "sticks.""^ Forcing developing countries that

do not have the technological

capabilities or the resources to adopt environmental production

standards comparable to that of the developed countries creates tension in the system and

does more harm than good."^
imperialism""'' and merely

Moreover, such unilateral "sticks"

draw

at

are

viewed as "eco-

best an unenthusiastic response and

dampened

implementation.
F.

The Gasoline Standards Case
Under

the

GATT

1994, a forum to which the decisions of the Panels

challenged was created in the Appellate Body, the benefit of which

United States appealed the Reformulated Gasoline case to the
United States limited

as the

CITES which

its

was seen when

the

WTO Appellate Body.'"" The

challenge to two of the Panel's findings.'"' First, the holding with

categorizes the endangered or threatened species, could validate measures.

"^5ee Trade and the Environment: A Report prepared by the
in

may be

John H. Jackson et

al..

GATT Secretariat,

(1992), excerpted

Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 561

(3d. ed., 1995).

Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83
2149-64
Geo. L.J. 2131,
(1995). Chang argues that "carrots" and "sticks" should be used simultaneously; he
But see Howard

F.

believes "sticks deter overuse of the environment" while "carrots create perverse incentive."

Id. at

2153.

"' See

Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System: Multilateral Environmental
Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PrOBS. 175, 210 (1996).
"' Jackson, 5Mpra note 19, at 1241.

and wealthy countries will impose

their

The term "eco-imperialism"

own views

standards on other parts of the world, even where such views
''°

The Gasoline Standards

case,

represents the concern that "powerful

regarding environmental or other social or welfare

may

not be entirely appropriate."

supra note 47. The introduction of a Appellate Body review has

been praised as perhaps the "most significant step toward the creation of an international
trade."
J.

Thomas

J.

Dillon,

Jr.,

Id.

The World Trade Organization:

A New Legal Order for World

legal tribunal

Tradel' 16

on

MiCH.

INT'L 349,379(1995).

'^'

See notes 47

to 53

and accompanying

text for a discussion

of the Reformulated Gasoline case.
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XX(g) and second,

respect to Article

the Panel's interpretation of Article

XX as a whole.

Notably, the finding under Article XX(b) was not challenged.
1.

Article

XX(g) Analysis

The Appellate Body began

its

analysis with the test under the phrase "relating to" to

After finding that the test applied was

the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
correct, the Appellate

Body took

particular exception to the erroneous application of the test

and the reasoning employed by the Panel. Instead of testing the measure
erroneously tested the legal conclusion arrived
results in turning Article

XX inside out.'"

at

Moreover, the Panel also erred

XX(b)

In holding that the Baseline Establishment

within the meaning of the term ''relating

Panel

under the "inland parity" analysis. This

the "necessary" standard applicable under Article

fell

at issue, the

to,"'"^

Rule

to Article
(part

in

misapplying

XX(g).

of the larger Gasoline Rule)

the Appellate

Body pointed

out that the

measure must be taken as a whole and analyzed. In other words, the "means" used by the
measure must

relate to the "objective"

measure would

satisfy the test

of the measure. If such a relationship

of "relating

to."'""*

The Appellate Body then proceeded
of Article XX(g)~ "made effective

in

to test the

failed the "relating to" test.

been interpreted

'^^

to

Id.

with" requirement,

which the

to investigate since the

United States

"made

effective" has

Venezuela and Brazil claimed

that

"primarily aimed at" making the domestic consumption or

The Gasoline Standards

•"/^. at 623.

'^^

mean

measure with the other requirement

conjunction

Reformulated Gasoline Panel had found unnecessary

measure

exists, then the

case, supra note 47, at 602.
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production effective. Further,

aimed

at'

it

argued that

in

order to be "properly regarded as "primarily

the conservation of natural resources, the baseline establishment rules

must not

only "reflect a conservation purpose" but also be shown to have had "some
conservation effect.""'"' Rejecting this line of reasoning, the Appellate
effective' refers to the
effect."'"^

with."

Likewise,

Thus viewed,

analysis. Rather,
in the

it

held that "made

measures being "operative, as "in force" or as having ""come

""in

conjunction with" should be read as "together with" or

the second part of

is

Body

positive

Article

XX(g) does not

into

""jointly

require a post prandial

a "requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions,

name of conservation, upon

the production or consumption of exhaustible natural

resources.
2.

The Chapeau Analysis
Having found that the Baseline Rule

set

satisfied Article

XX(g), the Appellate Body then

out to analyze the requirements under the preamble to Article

In this regard, the Appellate

Body

XX,

referred to as Chapeau.

stated that in order to fall under Article

XX:

must not only come under one or another of the particular
exceptions—paragraph (a) to (j) ~ listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the
requirements imposed in the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other
[T]he measure

at issue

words, two-tiered;

first,

provisional justification by reason of characterization of the

measure under Article XX(g);second, further appraisal of the same measure under
introductory clauses of Article XX.'"*

'" Id.

•2^

Id.

'" Id. at 625.

'2«

Id. at

626.

the

44

More

importantly, the Appellate

be tested on

its

own

Body held

that the Article

XX chapeau provisions must

standards and not on the standards set out in the substantive provisions

of the General Agreement.'-^ In

its

view, "such a recourse would also confuse the question

whether inconsistency with a substantive rule existed, with the hirther and separate question
arising under the

chapeau of article

XX as to

whether that inconsistency was nevertheless

justified.'"''^

The Appellate Body then proceeded
realized that

more than one

alternative

was

to

examine the adequacy of

available to the United States

discriminatory.'^'

The Appellate Body was unpersuaded by

United States as to

why

regard, the Appellate

concluded

It is

on

now

trade.

which were non-

the reasons put forth by the

Body agreed with

the Panel's finding.

Finally, the Appellate

'^"

clear that the

chapeau has

its

own

standards.

Consequently, the content and

should not constitute
(a) arbitrary discrimination,

where same conditions prevail

(b) unjustifiable discrimination; or

disguised restriction.

129

130

131

13:

Id.

Id.

Id. at

629.

Id

633.

at

Body

Rule was an "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised

scope of the chapeau becomes important. As the chapeau stipulates, a measure

(c)

It

other alternatives were not favored over the measure at issue. In this

that the Gasoline

restriction"

alternatives.

;

or

at issue

45

how

In an effort to clarify as to

the above standards

wondered whether those standards have
the

standard,

first

i.e,

"different fields

Body asked

itself if the

operate,

the Appellate

Body

of application."'^' With regard

to

between countries where the same conditions

"arbitrary discrimination

prevail." the Appellate

may

phrase referred only to conditions in exporting

countries, or both exporting and importing countries, or only between exporting countries
inter se. This question

was

left

unanswered. However, the Appellate Body pointed out that

the exceptions listed under Article
parity" but to

made

all

XX

relate

not just to the "inland parity" and '"foreign

the obligations under the General Agreement.

Such an

interpretation

is

possible by the wording ''nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the

adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ..." Lastly, the Appellate

Body

ruled that

and "disguised restriction on
may, accordingly, be read side-by-side; they impart meaning to one

"arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination:

international trade

another.

It is

clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in

international trade.

discrimination

in

It

is

equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or

international

trade

does not exhaust the meaning of "disguised

restriction."'^^

G.

A New Road Ahead
The Appellate Body's decision

significant impact

pointed out
it

in the

Reformulated Gasoline case will have a

on the policy debate between trade and the environment. Indeed,

many anomalies

in the Panel's decision

which

led to a

wrong conclusion.

it

has

First,

cleared the confusion by pointing out that the "inland parity" and "foreign parity" standards

'" Id.

"' Id. at 629.
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XX

and the Article

exceptions are distinct and

erroneous application of Article

XX standards.

tuna-ban analysis, the Appellate
standard that

more

is

Body has

Article XX(g), but also

Appellate

XX(g) and introduced
The

test for

Body

both "relating to" and the second part of
test to Article

rejected that standard and has injected a

It

Body has

a

earlier Panels not

XX(g). Thus viewed,
be made effective by

on domestic consumption or production. This posed a hurdle hard

more relaxed

clarified that Article

to clear.

The

standard.

XX requires a two-tier

has also specified the order to be followed. Indeed, as Professor Schoenbaum

notes, the "chapeau" has

meaning

interpreted Article

that the conservation efforts should

Furthermore, the Appellate
approach.

Also representing a clear departure from the

wrongly applied the "necessary"

"primarily aimed at" meant

This has led to some

not be mixed.

lenient than the existing tuna-ban standards.

only followed the 'primarily aimed at"

limitations

may

to the Article

been discovered with a vengeance. "'^^

XX

exceptions, however, the Appellate

articulated the proposition that Article

While

this gives

Body has

new

not clearly

XX General Exceptions should constitute a separate

framework of analysis. '^^ This can only be inferred from the decision.
It

was seen

that the treatment

of environmental measures under the Appellate Body

analysis has departed considerably from the tuna-dolphin decisions. Nevertheless, in the

absence of a "general agreement" on environment, the
effect to the purposes

and objects"

of the General Agreement,'^^ on a "case-by-case

'"

Schoenbaum, supra note

55, at 274.

'^^

See Donald M. Goldberg,

GATT

With Free Trade
'"

-

Part II

,

WTO Panels could continue to "given

Tuna-Dolphin

II: Environmental

Protection Continues to Clash

<http://www.econet.apc.org/ciel/issue2b.html> (visited 06/19/96).

The Gasoline Standards

case,

supra note 47,

at

622.

47
basis."

'^^

Moreover, even though there

is

every reason to believe that the World Trade

Organization can accommodate trade and environmental issues, harmonization efforts are
slow.

To

facilitate

such an integration, a proper "standard of review" must be framed. The

Appellate

Body Review provides such an

Appellate

Body

"judges"

Unlike the adhoc panels, the

opportunity.

two

are chosen for a period of

member Appellate Body is comprised of "persons of recognized authority,

with demonstrated

expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered
generally."

'^^

They can "determine questions of law and

Having demonstrated the need

more

on par with

agreements

legal interpretation"; thus, they

the unique opportunity to be creative and foster integration of trade
rightly placing environmental concerns

The seven

to four year terms.

have

and the environment by

trade concerns.

a standard of review that

would

readily reconcile trade and environment conflicts, the next chapter focuses

on the

Supreme Court of the United

States.

for, or the lack of,

jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the

The chapter

will

examine the case law of both jurisdictions with a view

principles and find out

how

conflicts

to identify the

between the two policy goals are resolved.

It

will

be

seen that both the systems have developed a clear and deliberate balancing of the two goals.
Finally, an analysis is

made

to explore if we could adopt the salient principles

reason approach to add to and enhance the ability of the

environment and trade

'^«

'^'

Disputes

,

WTO

to address

of the rule of

and reconcile

issues.

Id.

Art. 17, para. 3,
in

UNDERSTANDING ON Rules AND Procedure Governing the Settlement of

Jackson, supra note 67,

at

366.

CHAPTER III
LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:

A RULE OF REASON APPROACH
A.

Introduction

The

rule

of reason

is

a well recognized concept under the antitrust jurisprudence of

the United States.'

The Sherman

competition. Section

1

Antitrust Act.

of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combination

form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
states, or

with foreign nations

is

was a

And

Even though

^

of trade or commerce among the several

Read

literally,

testing for the legality

the Courts found that

and easily understood" and "judicially

'

in the

section

1

condemns

of the contract under the

categorical condemnation of any contract that restrained trade, resulting

in practical difficulties.

invalidating both

in restraint

declared to be illegal."^

"every contract" that restrains trade.
'per se' rule

proscribes agreements that restrain

good and bad

efficient,"

practices.'*

The

it

was

per se

"rigid

rule of reason,

rules are "easily applied

and formalistic" resulting

which was formulated

in

in the

Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A.Sullivan, Cases and Materials on Antitrust 69-98 (1989).
15U.S.C.,

§

1

(1988).

'Id.

See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standardfor Section
Sherman Act, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1753, 1756 (1994).
*

the

48

1

of

49
beginning of the twentieth century/ introduced "judicial flexibihty" that was needed to

advance the goals of antitrust law.^ The rule of reason analysis required courts "to balance
the potential pro-competitive benefits of the challenged practice against the competitive

harms

that

may

from the challenged

result

practice."'

Though

the doctrine has taken several

formulations through the years,^ for the purpose of this analysis,
the overriding
rule

theme of the

of reason concept

trade

rule of reason

in antitrust

itself easily to the resolution

and environment. Antitrust law characterized as the 'magna

stands for free and fair competition, like the

^

One of

Subsequently,

in

the early rule of reason cases

Chicago Bd. of Trade

v.

will suffice to note that

the need to balance the contending goals.

is

law lends

it

is

GATT/WTO

Standard Oil Co.

United States,

carta'

v.

To

regulation of trade, restrains.

^

See William

test

Id

is

aims

1

Justice Brandeis,

at a

(1911).

who

is

agreement or regulation

of their very essence." Id

NCAA w Board of Regents and a

Flexibility Without Sacrificing Efficiency.

'

liberty,^

[such as the per se rule] .... Every agreement concerning trade, every

bind, to restrain,

Sims, Note,

J.

identical

United States, 221 U.S.

246 U.S. 231, 238, (1918),

credited for articulating the Rule of Reason analysis, observed that "the legality of an

cannot be determined by so simple a

of conflict between

of economic

which has

The

Truncated Rule of Reason: Retaining

27 ARIZ. L. REV. 193, 196-97(1985).

at n.4.

See Peter W. Bellas, Comment, NCAA v. Board of Regents Supreme Court Intercepts Per Se Rule
and Rule of Reason, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 529, 540 (1985). Traditionally, the rule of reason requires a "market
power" analysis. To apply the rule of reason, several factors are analyzed. The analysis includes factors such
as "the circumstances peculiar to the defendant's business, the condition before and after the restraint was
*

restraint, and the competitive effect of the restraint" are considered."
The European Court of Justice however took a very limited approach. It took

imposed, the nature and purpose of the
Piraino,

supra note

4, at

1

76

1

.

the rule of reason as a doctrine that fundamentally involves a balancing of benefits against harm. For a further

discussion of the European Court's treatment of the rule of reason, see infra.

'United States
States]

Sherman Act

v.

Topco

Associates,

in particular, are the

405 U.S. 596 (1972)("Antitrust laws

Magna

Carta of free enterprise").

in general,

and the [United

50
global level.

deserves the

It

will be seen that the

much needed

Indeed, the

GATT/WTO,

flexibility the rule

GATT/WTO

a "rule-oriented" regime,

is

of reason affords.

'°

Panels have used the rule of reason approach, albeit in a

non-structured way." In comparison with section
analysis, Article

which

1

of the Sherman Act and a rule of reason

XX exceptions in the GATTAVTO may very well provide a framework for

such an analysis. In the tuna-ban analysis, the
States' regulations

and the

legislative object

GATT

Panels' examination of the United

and scope of it

is

a clear application of the rule

of reason approach. However, as mentioned above, the application of the rule of reason

must be made

analysis

As

Professor

Schoenbaum

the rule of reason rubric.'"
States

way.

in a structured

notes, there is a paucity

In this regard,

it

may be

of GATT determinations under

instructive to look into

how

the United

and the European Union have dealt with the issues of trade and environment

conflict.

Despite "vital contextual and institutional differences," the United States and the European

Union

share a

common

feature: division

local/state authorities.'^ Notably, the

'°

two systems have

See generally Bellas, supra note

New World Order,
^'See

Thomas

J.

Irreconcilable Conflict?.

'^

on

their courts to

advance

their

GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection

23 Envtl. L. 397, 434

(

1

993).

Schoenbaum, Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment:
86 AM J. INT'L L. 700, 715(1 992).

See Terrance Sandalow

Perspectives

relied

8.

" See Janet McDonald, Greening the
in the

of governmental powers between central and

&. Eric Stein,

Two Systems: An

From the United States And Europe

Overview, in

3 (Terrance

Sandalow

COURTS AND FREE MARKETS:

& Eric Stein eds., vol.

1

,

1982).
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goals.

'^

The

principles evolved

States and the

by the "highly respected"

legal institutions

European Union may provide a useful framework

The United

States

for our analysis.

a classic example of a federal entity with an integrated market

is

based on free trade between the States of the federation.
consists of

Similarly, the

group of States representing a single market based on

a

national borders.'^

Though

there are

some

differences',^

are identical in that both have

environment conflict

of the United

European Union
free trade across

the approaches to the trade and

acknowledged the importance of

environmental concerns and have ensured a high level of protection of the environment even
if

it

results in disruption of free trade.

In that process, both the Courts have adopted a

conceptual framework within which to decide the issues. Such an approach
the
It

GATTAVTO dispute resolution system.

At

its

best,

it

is

in the process

is

lacking under

of development.

needs to be strengthened.

B.

The Rule of Reason Approach of the European Union

1.

The Free Movement of Goods

'^

Cornell

But see Steve Chamovitz, Free Trade,

Int'l L.

J.

are "not transferable to the

respected institutions, which

on the

On

Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate, 27

459, 482 (1994). Chamovitz cautions that the adjudicative approach of the United States

and the European Union
evidence.

Principle

is

the contrary, the

parties until the decision

not so with the

GATT

GATT"

Panels.

because the former institutions are highly

Id.

Such a view, however,

WTO Panels decide issues of worldwide
is

overruled. See Philip

is

unsupported by

importance and as such are binding

M. Nichols, Trade Without

Values,

90 Nw. U.

L.

REV.

658,659(1996).

Damien Geradin, Free Trade and Environmental Protection in An Integrated Market: A Survey
Law of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Justice, 2 J. TraNSNAT'L
&P0L'Y141, 143(1993).
'^

of the Case

'^

supra note

For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the two systems, see Stein
12, at 4.

&

Sandalow,
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The European Union
market.'^

Toward

"ambitious" in terms of achieving the goal of a single

that goal. Articles

movement of goods
restrictions

is

across

on imports and

its

30 and 34 of the European Treaty

member

Member
The

sought to be enforced

the Dassonville case"'

The European Court

effect".

which the

zeal with

where

all

shall,

States."'*

"Quantitative

without prejudice to
Similarly, Article 34

measures having equivalent

effect, shall

States."'^ Together, they prohibit quantitative restrictions

reflected in the

is

between Member

on exports, and

states: "Quantitative restrictions

exports and imports. ^°

Article 30 states that

measures having equivalent effect

all

the following provisions, be prohibited

be prohibited between

States.

ensure the free

it

free

movement of goods

European Court's ruling

drew a wide

circle for the

held: "All trading rules enacted

in the

principle

on

was

landmark decision of

"measures having equivalent

by Member States which are

capable of hindering, directly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be

considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions."^^ Thus,

even potential hindrance was not

toward the environment

tolerated.

Such a high policy commitment was not reflected

in the formative years

of the European Union.

" Hession and Macrory, Balancing Trade Freedom with Sustainable Development,

in THE EUROPEAN
Union and World Trade Law After the Gatt Uruguay Round 189 (Nicholas Emiliou & David

O'Keeffe

eds., 1996).

'*

"

Art. 30,

Art. 34,

European Union Treaty.
European Union Treaty.

Peter Oliver, Free Movement of Goods
TO 34 OF THE Rome Treaty 61 (3d. ed., 1996).
^°

^'

Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837.

'^

Id. at

852.

in

the European Community under Articles 30

53

2.

Environmental Policy of the European Union
Like in the

GATT/WTO,

European Union. Rather,
stages."^ In the first stage,

The second

it's

environment was not an explicitly recognized policy

environmental policy that

we

see today took shape in three

environmental policy was unsupported by the treaty provisions.

stage from the Single European Act in 1987 to that of the European

evidenced a growth of legal basis for the environmental policy.
started with the entry into force

commitment

to "achieve

in the

The

Union Treaty

third phase

which

of the European Union Treaty characterizes a strong policy

environmental protection and sustainable development."""* Article

13 Or, para. 2 of the European

Union Treaty

sets out the basic

environmental policy of the

Community.
Under European Union law, a provision

similar to Article

XX of the GATT is Article

36 of the European Union Treaty. Article 36 provides:

The provisions of Articles 30

on
on grounds of public morality, public policy or
protection of health and life of humans, animal or plants; the protection
to

34

shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions

imports, exports or goods in transit justified

public security; the

of national treasures possessing
industrial

constitute a

It is

member

^^

artistic, historic

and commercial property.

restriction shall not,

means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised

restriction

on

trade.

however,
"^

seen that the Treaty provides a catalog of exceptions in Article 36 under which

States

may

use national measures to protect the

life

and health of humans, animals

Joachim Scherer, Regional Perspectives on Trade and the Environment: The European Union,

Sustainable Development and International

"

or archeological value; or the protection of

Such prohibitions or

Art. 36,

European Union Treaty.

Law

254 (Winfried Lang

ed., 1995).

in

54
and plants as well as for other selected

reasons.-^^

not been explicitly mentioned and as such,

it

Nevertheless, the

may

word "environment" has

not be an adequate

means

to safeguard the

environment.

The Theory of Mandatory Requirements

3.

As mentioned
a

way that was

above, the European Court had interpreted Article 30 very widely in

hard to

tell

"where the reach of this branch of EC law

case in which the European Court moderated

its

'stops'"."^

The

classic

Dassonville ruling and developed the 'Rule

of Reason' was the Cassis de Dijon case.^^ The European Court said:

Obstacles to

movement

within the

Community

resulting in disparities

the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in question
in so far as those provisions

may

mandatory requirements relating

between

must be accepted

be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
in particular to the effectiveness

of fiscal supervision,

the protection of health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the

consumer.'^
This case arose

when

beverages from the
content.

the Federal Republic of Germany slapped an import

Member

States

ban on alcoholic

which did not contain a minimum of 25 percent alcohol

Relying on Article 36, the German government claimed that the restriction was

necessary in order to protect the public health, because non-German alcoholic beverages had
a lower-proof which allegedly induced a tolerance towards alcohol than those with a higher

-*

Andreas

R. Ziegler,

Trade and Environmental Law

in

the European Community 61

(1996).

-^Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EC Law:Text, Cases,
^*

Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral

AG

v.

1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979)[hereinafter Cassis].
^"Id.

at

692.

And Materials

Bundesmonopolverwaltung

fur

584 (1995).

Branntwein {Cassis de Dijon),
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alcohol content. ^°

Germany

also claimed that the tax rate

was lower on

the lower-proof

beverages; thus the producers of lower proof alcoholic beverages had an unfair advantage

over the producers of higher proof alcoholic beverages.

The European Court

rejected both the arguments.

To

reject the alcohol tolerance

argument of Germany, the European Court did not make any
evidence. Rather,
that,

in practice,

consequently,

it

it

rested

it's

reasoning on the

much of the

facts.

effort

to

go

Indeed, the European Court found

higher proof alcohol was consumed after

was unnecessary

to

examine the

into scientific

scientific basis

it

was

diluted:

of 'tolerance inducement'

claim of Germany. With regard to the 'unfair advantage' argument, the European Court
pointed that

Germany could have achieved

the result of a 'level-playing field' for both

producers of higher and lower-proof alcohol by less burdensome measures such as labellmg,
rather than applying different tax rates. ^'

of reason"
impact on

test

under which

trade.^'

it

In so doing, the

European Court applied the

"rule

weighed the contending goals of the measures against

its

Thus, the European Court adopted a balancing approach between the

environmental concerns and

the trade interests.

In order to satisfy the rule of reason

analysis, the Court looks not only into the motives of the

measure but also into the

effects

of the measure.

The Cassis

ruling stands for several propositions.

allowed two sets of bases under which

^°

member

States

First, the

may

Court of Justice has

safeguard environment: the

Mat 662-63.

"M

at

664.

" Kenneth M. Lord, Note, Bootstrapping An Environmental Policy From An Economic Covenant:
The Teleological Approach of the European Court of Justice, 29 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 571, 581 (1996).
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Article 36 and the Cassis doctrine. Second, the Cassis doctrine created an

of "mandatory requirements" which could limit the application of free
thus reflecting that free

movement of goods

is

open ended Hst

movement of goods;

not an overriding concern/^ Even under

Cassis however, the "mandatory requirements" did not explicitly mention environmental
protection, although

its

implication

became evident.^'' Though some commentators^^ mention

Waste Oils case as including environment into the mandatory requirements,

Danish

Bottles^^ case

which confirmed the protection of

mandatory requirements.

it

may now

Moreover, even though the environment

after

be protected

an analysis of the

case-law, one commentator concludes that Article 36 and the rule of reason has been

Furthermore, the European Court applies the condition laid

" See Belgian Wastes

case.

Case 2/90, Commission

opinion) as cited in Geradin, supra note 15, at 185,

"

Geradin, supra note 15,

at 180, citing

n.

Belgium, ECJ, July

v.

" Geradin, supra note

at

9,

merged

down

in the

1992 (unpublished

227.

the "communication from the

Commission concerning

consequences of the judgment given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979
Dijon) 1980 O.J. (C256)2." Id.

the

environment as part of the

by national measures either under Article 36 or the rule of reason,

in its application.^'

was

in

the

Case 120/78 (Cassis de

note 202.

is of the view that the rule of reason was
Weatherhill & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW: THE ESSENTIAL
Guide to the Legal Workings of the European Community 502 (new ed., 1995). The authors suggest

formulated

in the

that the rule

^^

15, at 181.

Another commentator

Dassonville case. See STEPHEN

of reason

is

a 'fijsion' of the Dassonville

Case 302/86, Commission

v.

cases. Id.

Kingdom of Denmark, 1988

case].

" ZlEGLER, supra note

and Cassis

26, at 69.

E.C.R. 4607 [hereinafter Danish Bottles

57

second sentence

to Article

challenged measure

may

36 as part of rule of reason analysis/* Thus,

is

clear that a

not be discriminatory^^ or constitute disguised discrimination.

The Rule of Reason Conditions

4.

In the

view of Verloren Van Themaat, a noted authority on the Community law. the

of reason describes a "general principle of interpretation

down by

provisions of the [European Union] Treaty.

applies the second sentence of Article 36

a

it

means of arbitrar>' discrimination or
It is

which

""*°

rule

in relation to strict interpretation laid

As shown above,

states that a

the rule of reason

measure should not "constitute

a disguised restriction on trade."""

evident from an analysis of the case-law that the European Court has formulated

four conditions under the rule of reason. First, the policy objectives must

where the Community

legislation

is

scarce. Second, the

measure

at issue

fall in

an area

must genuinely

pursue the stated goals of Article 36 or be covered by the mandatory requirements. Third, the

measure must not

''

Id

^^

See

arbitrarily discriminate or

be a disguised one. Fourth, a "relationship"

at 72.

[hereinafter the

e.g..

Case 4/75, Rewe Zentralfinanz

REWE case]

in

GmbH

which the European Court

v.

LandwirtschaftsKammer, 1975 E.C.R. 843,

states that differences in treatment

and domestic products could be viewed as discriminatory unless there
See also BURROWS, FREE
that the

is

between imported

reason to believe to the contrary. Id

MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 60 (1987), where Burrows

points out

European Court has applied only one condition of the second sentence of article 36, namely, arbitrary

discrimination and has

left

out "disguised discrimination".

But see ZlEGLER, supra note 26,

Ziegler points out, referring to subsequent case-law that the second sentence

is

at 73,

where

applied to the rule of reason

test. Id.

^°

See Weatherhill

&

BEAUMONT, supra

opinion (who on analogies with the

US

note 35

at

510,

n.

41, citing Verloren

interpretation in relation to strict prohibitions laid down by provisions of the
Oosthoek Uitgeversmaatschappij Bv., [1982] E.C.R. 4575.

"'

Article 36,

Van Themaat's

law opined that the rule of reason describes a "general principle of

EUROPEAN UNION TREATY.

EEC

Treaty") in Case 286/81,
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should exist between the stated objective and the measure

European Court typically examines the following

a relationship exists or not. the
(a)

(b)

whether the measure

is

To determine whether

at issue.

factors:

capable of attaining the indicated objective,

whether the measure chosen

is

the least trade-restrictive

measure leading

to the

desired level of protection, and
(c)

whether the

restrictive character

in relation to the

The
third

first

improvement

in

of the measure

is

proportionate, that

is,

not excessive

^
environmental quality.

and second conditions are particular

of the European Union; the

to the context

and fourth conditions are relevant for this analysis.

It

must be pointed out however that

other than specifying the conditions broadly, the European Court like the

would

also had difficulty in articulating the specific elements that

GATT Panels have

fall

under the salient

conditions.
a.

Arbitrary Discrimination

What

precisely constitutes 'arbitrary discrimination'

is

'discrimination' connotes unequal treatment of equals.^"' If so,
'arbitrary' is superfluous.'*'*

However, case-law suggests

Commission, the European Court articulated

'*^

*'

ZlEGLER, supra note 26,

due

to the fact that the

modelled."
*^

might seem

that the

that this is not ^b.

term

In Italy

v.

that:

is

defined as

"to

make

a difference in treatment on a basis other than

THE Merrjam WEBSTER Dictionary (new

" Oliver, supra note

it

In legal parlance,

at 73.

The word "discriminate"

individual merit." See

elusive.

20, at

1

82.

ed., 1994).

Oliver believes that the use of the word "arbitrary

term "arbitrary discrimination" appear

in Article

" is

"no doubt

XX of GATT on which Article 36

is

Id.

See

e.g.,

significance. Id.

BURROWS, supra note

39, at 63.

Burrows believes

that the

term "arbitrary"

is

not without

59

The

different treatment

the conclusion that there

is

of non-comparable situations does not lead automatically
discrimination.

An appearance of discrimination

in

to

form may

therefore in fact correspond to an absence of discrimination in substance. Discrimination
in substance

would

consist in treating either similar situations differently or different

situations identically."*^

Under

this rule

situations.

it

becomes important then

to determine

whether there

discrimination.

The Buy

determine the presence of arbitrary discrimination.

to

State promotion to purchase domestic
Irish^^ case

goods as opposed
is

to foreign

discrimination.'*^

the

lack

goods

is

an arbitrary

a good example. Similarly, restrictions that

heavily on imported products than on domestically produced good

is

"similarity" of

This comparison of how the domestic goods are treated as opposed to imported

goods has helped the European Court

it

is

would

fall

constitute arbitrary

A lack of domestic restrictions would constitute discrimination;

however,

of proper justification that makes a measure constitute

"arbitrary

discrimination."

was

This

demonstrated

in

the

Rewe-Zentralfinanz

v.

LandwirtschaftsKammer'*^ where even though were no corresponding phytosanitary controls

on domestically produced apples

that

were required

for imported apples, the

European Court

held that:

The

different treatment of imported

and domestic products, based on the need

to prevent

the spread of the harmful organism could not, however, be regarded as arbitrary

'"Case 13/63,
''

Italy

v.

Commission, 1963 E.C.R. 165.

Case 249/81, Commission

"^e Commission v.

v. Ireland,

[1982] E.C.R. 4005.

France, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 743, para. 7.33

(

where advertising

restrictions

imposed on imported alcoholic drinks on grounds of public health. Even though some domestic
were caught by the restrictions, the European Court held that it was arbitrary discrimination).
'"Case4/75, [1975] E.C.R. 843.

were

industries

60
discrimination

if effective

measures are taken

contaminated domestic products and

if there is

basis of previous experience, that there

no inspection

is

in order to

is

prevent the distribution of

reason to beUeve, in particular on the

a risk of the harmful organism's spreading if

held on importation.^*^

This equality of treatment was reiterated by the European Court in the Conegate^^ case in

which

held that a total ban of "dolls" on public morality grounds must be matched by a ban

it

on the domestic 'manufacture or marketing of the same goods" within the regulating
b.

State.^"

Disguised Restriction
This

test

is to

examine whether the measure

at issue is protectionist in nature.

order to do so, the European Court will not take the measure

behind the measure.^" The underlying rationale for

An

'''*

whether there are

Typically, the Court looks to see

any "non-economic" reasons.^^
obvious form of disguised restriction was seen

Kingdom,^^'m which United

^'

value but will look

this test is to detect

motives other than those supplied by the regulating party.
if there are

at its face

In

Kingdom banned

Case 121/85, Conegate Ltd.

v.

in

Commission

v.

United

the import of poultrymeat alleging public

Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [1986] E.C.R. 1007, para.

16 [hereinafter Conegate case].

'-Id

" ZlEGLER, supra note 26,
^^

See Hession

Oliver states that

"it

&

at 90.

Macrory, supra note

17, at 199.

much

expression [disguised restriction]." /(^(footnotes omitted).

" Case
'*

95/81,

Commission

v.

Italy,

Case 40/82, [1982] E.C.R. 2793.

at 184, where
same meaning even without this

But see Oliver, supra note 20,

has been suggested that Article 36 would have

[1982] E.C.R. 2187, 2204.

the

61

health and animal health reasons to prevent the spread of Newcastle disease.

Court rejected

this

claim because

it

The European

found that the measure was motivated by reasons other

than those supplied.^^ The European Court went further to state that "since the import ban

on trade between Member

constituted a disguised restriction

was not justified under
c.

The

Article 36

was

States, the

presumption that

it

increased."^^

Principle of Proportionality

In general terms, the Proportionality rule states that the trade-restrictiveness of an

environmental measure must be directly proportional to the level of protection needed for the
protection of the targeted entity. Typically,
First, a "target" that

discretion for the

two

factors

must be known

needs protection must be identified. In

Member

States as

it

is

this regard, there is

very

little

confined to the policy objectives stated in Article

36 or the rule of reason. Second, the level of protection needed to
the "target".

for this rule to apply.

retain, regain or

conserve

Since the dangers to the environmental target and consequently the level of

protection needed to conserve the target varies from case to case, the European Court has

approached

this issue

on a case-by-case

basis.

As

such, the European Court has not evolved

a clear set of rules and the assessment of the degree of protection determine the level of trade

" The European Court found "that for some months prior to the introduction of the ban the United
Kingdom Government had been subject to pressure from domestic poultry producers to block imports. This
was well documented in the British press. Secondly, the ban was announced on August 27, 1981 and came
into effect on September
98
It was thus introduced so hastily that the Commission and the Member States
were neither consulted nor even informed in good time. This timing also had the effect of excluding french
Christmas turkeys from the British market for the 1981 season. Thirdly, when France sought to comply with
the new British requirement, the United Kingdom refused to take cognisance of it, adding a further requirement
1

,

1

1

.

which France did not meet." Oliver, supra note 20, at 184. Cases such as these are
the disguised restriction is more subtle and hard to determine.
'*

Oliver

,

supra note 20,

at

1

85.

rare.

In reality

however,
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restriction that

be allowed. However an analysis reveals that the European Court has

may

consistently applied the following guidelines:
(a)

whether the measure

is

genuinely aimed

at or

reasonably justified for the attempted

objective (suitability or reasonableness of a measure).
(b)

whether the measure

implying that

it

is

essential or necessary for the attainment of the objective,

has to be the least trade-restrictive measure available

alternatives (least trade restrictive measure),
(c)

whether the improvement

in

among

several

and

environmental quality

is

proportionate to the restriction

of trade resulting from this measure. This third aspect requires a sound relationship
between the restrictive character of a measure and its result (proportionality or
prohibition of excessiveness).^^

The Danish

Bottles

case,'''^ is

a classic illustration where the European Court applied

the Principle of Proportionality. In this case, the

under which the manufacturers of beer and

Danish Government introduced a system

soft drinks

had

to

market

their

beverages in

reusable containers. Also, such reusable containers had to be approved by the Danish

environmental authorities. However, following protests from other

Commission
amended

Member

States

and the

for foreign exporters, the

Danish Government

the law and established a deposit-and-retum system under

which non-approved

that the rule

is

burdensome

containers could be used upto a certain quantity set by the Danish Government.^'

The Commission challenged

the Danish

measure as inconsistent with Article 30 of

the Treaty and claimed that the Danish Government's object of protecting the environment

could be achieved by less trade restrictive means. The Commission alleged that the deposit

and return system with

''

ZlEGLER, supra note 26,

^ Danish
""

limits

Id.

at

amounted

to

a quantitative restriction.

97-8 (footnotes omitted).

Bottles case, supra note 36.

The Danish
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Government contended

that

its

protection of the environment.

European Court recognized

measure constitutes

With regard
that the

to the

a "mandatory requirement" for the

compulsory deposit-and-retum system, the

recycHng of containers furthered the aims of the

measure. Though the deposit and return system imposes a burden on the free

goods among member

States, the

European Court found

"disproportionate" to the goal sought to be achieved.

that the

movement of
was not

measure

Nevertheless, the European Court

reasoned that the restriction on quantity could not be tolerated since

it

hinders free

movement

of the good and the adverse trade effects outweigh the benefits the measure seeks to achieve.

The European Court found

that the adverse trade impacts created

disproportionate to the objective pursued.""
Further, in several other cases, the
to

mean and

are not "necessar}

"

measures.

European Court has held Proportionality Principle

include 'necessity' which requires the European Court look into the extent of

the burden

Preparation

Such measures

by the measure was

the challenged measure imposes
Case,^"*

Germany adopted

on

trade.^^

a regulation whereby

Thus, in the
it

German Meat

prohibited the sale of meat

products from meat which had not been processed in the country the meat was produced.
Rejecting Germany's "public health" arguments, the European Court found that though

Germany

did not prevent meat imports from other countries, the "processing requirement"

was considered burdensome and disproportionate
Moreover,

"

'necessity' requires that there

Id. at

of the measure.^^

be a "casual connection" between the measure

4632.

" ZlEGLER, supra note

" Case

to the purported objective

153/78,

26, at 182.

Commission

v.

Federal Republic of Germany, 1979 E.C.R. 2555 (1979).
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imposed and the objective
the Itahan ban

on the

souglit.

Likewise, in the Gilli case,^^ the European Court rejected

sale of non-wine vinegar unjustifiable, since the

nexus "justifying any

restriction

Court did not see the

on the importation of the product [non-wine vinegar]

in

question from the point of view either of the protection of public health or of the fairness of

commercial transactions or the defense of the consumer."^''
Furthermore, the European Court has pointed out in some cases

that,

where adequate

alternatives are available,

measures whose effects on trade are minimal should be used

attain the objective.^^ This

emphasis on the

Waste

Oils^^ case. In

Waste

Oils, the

"least restrictive altemative(s)"

European Court

reiterated that free

freedom of trade

is

principles of the

the European Court hastened to add that

not superior than other concerns and consequently, trade concerns do not

require absolute treatment over other concerns. Rather,

of environmental protection, which

is

Essential as environmental protection

is,

is

in the

movement of goods,

freedom of competition, and freedom of trade make up the elemental

Community law7° Simultaneously however,

was made

to

it

must be seen

in the "perspective

one of the Community's essential objectives."^'
if less restrictive alternatives exist,

a

Member

State

required to adopt such a measure. This principle derived further strength in the Belgian

*"

"

Case 788/79, Criminal proceedings against
Id. at

Gilli

and Andres, 1980 E.C.R. 2071 (1980).

2078.

**

Geradin, supra note

^'

Case 240/83, Procureru de

1984 E.C.R. 531 (1984).

™

Id. at

548.

'

Id. at

549.

1

5, at

181.

la

Republique

v.

Association de Defense des Bruleurs d'huiles Usagees,
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where the measure which required imported margarine be sold

Butter case,^"

in a

cube-

shaped blocks to differentiate between butter and margarine on health grounds was rejected
as other effective

measures such as labelling were available/^

C.

The Balancing Approach

1.

The Dormant Clause Power
The

principle of unhindered

United States
It

is

states that "[t]he

may

movement of the goods

implicitly stated in the

several States."^"*

or

of the United States

Congress

shall

across the several States in the

Commerce Clause of the United

have power ...

to regulate

States Constitution.

Commerce

.

.

.

However, since the Commerce clause "does not say what the

not do in the absence of congressional action,"'^ the United States

has interpreted the

Commerce Clause

power

states

to place unjustifiable

Further, in the context of trade and environment conflict,

may

Supreme Court

at the

same

time, a negative

burdens on interstate commerce.'^
it

is

important to notice the absence

of explicit reference to environmental protection in the United States Constitution. Given
absence, the "green"

'-

Case

power

261/81,

first

Walter

belong to the several States. Even as the

Rau

Lebensmittelwerke

v.

De Smedt PvbA,

(1982)[hereinafter Belgian butter case]. See also Case 104/75, Adriaan de Peijper,

Centrafarm BV, 1976 E.C.R. 613 (1976)(challenging a

Danish

pharmaceutical products to obtain clearance documents from
^'

Belgian butter case, supra note 72.

''

U.S. Const., Art.

s. 8, cl.

1,

its

States' exercised

1982

E.C.R.

613

Managing Director of

regulation which required importers of

3.

H.P.

Sons

v.

Du Mond, 336

'^

See e.g. Wyoming

v.

Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992); Maine

&

this

national health authorities).

"

Hood

the

an affirmative grant of authority to the

to include

Congress to integrate the markets across the several States and,
prohibition on the States'

among

U.S. 525, 535 (1949).

v.

Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
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their

power

to protect the environment, they

must do so without affecting unduly the

flow of commerce. The Supreme Court realized that a balance must be struck
ensure the benefits of free flow of commerce and high environmental quality.

free

in order to

An

analysis

of the case-law shows that the Supreme Court has favored a balancing approach that required

on the flow of

a distinction between "outright protectionism" and the "indirect burdens

trade.""

Measures

that hinder trade across the States

may be

facially neutral measures. In contrast, subtle but definite

non-discriminatory measures also.

To be

sure, the

either facially discriminatory or

burdens on trade

may

Supreme Court has created

be caused by
different tests

for each of these categories. In order to determine the test to be applied, typically, the

uses a two-step analysis.^*
discrimination.

The

first

step

involves a determination of the degree of

The degree of discrimination determines

Discriminatory measures receive a

Court

strict scrutiny,

the

test

to

be

applied.

whereas non-discriminatory measures

receive a less strict balancing approach between the burdens and the benefits of the measure.
2.

The Dean Milk Test
As

when

early as in 1950, the

a measure

is

Supreme Court of the United

facially neutral in the

Dean Milk

States

answered what happens

Co. v. City of Madison.

^'^

In

Dean Milk,

the city of Wisconsin erected a 'five-mile milk' ordinance under

which milk which was

was prohibited from

sale, allegedly to protect

pasteurized beyond five miles radius of the city

"

City of Philadelphia

^^

Erin A. Walter, Note, The

v.

New

Jersey,

437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).

Supreme Court Goes Dormant When Desperate Times Call Desperate

Measures: Looking to the European Union for a Lesson
1161, 1176(1996).

'^40

U.S. 349,354(1951).

in

Environmental Protection, 65

FORDHAM L. REV.
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the quality of milk and thus the health and well-being of the local community.

noted that the ordinance

was

at issue

facially neutral, as

outside the five mile limit equally. ^° That sanitary regulation

was

applied to

it

all

milk producers

was a legitimate

local

readily conceded.*' Nevertheless, the Court held that the City of Madison's

a plain discrimination against interstate commerce.*"
to protect the health

and safety of

its

It

The Court

concern

measure

is

held that even ''unquestioned power

people" cannot justify discriminatory measures,

if

reasonably non-discriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests
are available."*^

The Court found

and

system were available.*^ Similarly,

certification

that non-discriminatory alternatives
in

Hunt

v.

such as inspection

Washington State Apple

Advertising Commission,^^ the Court held that a facially neutral measure would survive
judicial scrutiny only if

it

furthers a legitimate state goal

and there are no reasonable non-

discriminatory alternatives. Placing the burden on the regulating

state, the

Court

in

Hunt

added:

When

discrimination against

commerce of

the burden falls on the state to justify

it

the type

we have found

is

demonstrated,

both in terms of the local benefits flowing

*°/^. at353.

''Id.

'-

Id

at

354.

''Id
''*

Id.

at

354-56.

In order to

testimonies and recommendations.

Id.

determine the adequacy of alternatives, the court took note of the
This was not sufficient for the dissent. The dissent argued that the

record was not sufficient to determine the adequacy of the solutions. Moreover, the courts cannot 'secondguess' the adequacy of alternatives.
dissenting).

'M32

U.S. 333(1977).

Id.

at

359-60 (Black

J.

dissenting,

Douglas

&

Minton

JJ.,

concurred,
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from the

statute

and the unavailabihty of non-discriminatory ahematives adequate

to preserve the local interests

The P/Ae

3.

When

Test:

A

at stake.

^^

Further Refinement

faced with measures that have legitimate local interests, the Court has applied

a lower standard of scrutiny set forth in Pike

v.

Bruce Church,

deliberately balances the legitimate local interests against

measure

will pass scrutiny unless the burden

In

interests.

Where

its

words, the Court

in

Pike held

Under

Pike, the Court

on

The

its

incidental effect

is

clearly in excess of the local

trade.

that:

the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,

on interstate commerce
burden imposed on such commerce is
and

on trade

Inc.^^

effect

its

are only incidental,

it

will be

upheld unless the

clearly excessive in relation to the putative local

becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interests involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with
lesser impact on interstate activities.**
benefits. ...

If a legitimate local interest is found, then the question

Further, for the Pike test to apply, a statute

must be evenhanded.

When there

discrimination between in-state and out-of-state commerce, the measure

Even

evenhanded.

in

is

evenhanded measures, the Court recognizes however

measure

'*

minimal trade impacts could be ignored.

will be struck

Id

at

"397
^*

down. In Minnesota

353 (citations omitted).

U.S. 137(1970).

Mat

142.

449 U.S. 456(1981).

v.

If

impact on trade

Clover Leaf Creamery

is

no

viewed as
that

incidental effects on trade could occur. Considering the local benefits the measure
bring, the

is

some
would

excessive, the

Co.,^'^

the

Supreme

69
Court applied the Pike

test to

uphold a Minnesota law that banned

containers on the grounds of environment protection.

plastic non-returnable

Note must be made

that the

Court

favored the Minnesota legislation even though the measure had burdensome effects on trade,

such as paralyzing out-of-state industry and protecting local industry. ^'^ In other words, the

Supreme Court has

clearly indicated that

it

would lean toward legitimate

local interests if the

burdens on trade are not excessive.
4.

The Per Se Standard
With regard

scrutiny.

to discriminatory measures, the

Philadelphia

v.

New Jersey^^

Court has applied a

tested the validity of a

prohibited the import of waste into the state from outside.^'

New

stricter level

of

Jersey statute which

Pointing out that whatever the

ultimate aim of the measure at issue, the principle of non-discrimination must be not

Court reiterated that there are two standards that

violated,^^ the

context.

One

is

the "per se" rule

which condemns measures

that are

nature; those measures "overtly block[] the flow of interstate

hand,

if a

apply. ^^

1973);

measure advances a

To apply

it

is critical

be applicable in the

simply protectionist in

commerce. "'*

local interest in a non-discriminatory

the right test then,

may

to determine

way, the Pike

'-Mat

618.

'^

Id. at

627.

'"

Id

at

624. See also Welton

^'

Id

at

624.

v.

Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).

the other

test

would

whether the measure

^"
Id. See also American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n., 517
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).

''437 U.S. 617(1978).

On

P. 2d.

is

691 (Ore. App.
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The Court held

protectionist.

whether the measure

that

though a "purpose" analysis would be helpful

protectionist or not,

is

protectionism can reside in legislative

means

Furthermore, the Court noted that

show why

it

differently

from the

statute

it

is

not dispositive because

the "evil of

as well as legislative ends."''^

New Jersey

had not offered any explanation

to

violated the principle of non-discrimination^' by treating out-of-state waste
in-state waste.

was a protectionist measure.

were available such as
trade distortions

may

Whenever

is

the

environmental measures,

Sanitary Landfill

Consequently, the Court concluded that the
Further, the Court

restricting the

occur.^^

means by which a goal

emphasized

flow of waste into

New Jersey

that adequate alternatives

landfills,

even though incidental

Thus, not only should the end be justifiable, but also the

achieved should be justifiable.

Supreme court
it

Inc., v.

saw "economic protectionism"

has not hesitated to apply the Philadelphia

test.

in the guise

of

In Fort Gratiot

Michigan Department of Natural Resources,^^ for example,

Michigan's Solid Waste Management Act

(SWMA) provided that

a county must be disposed within that county.

solid waste generated in

Waste from another county.

State or country

A statute as clearly discriminatory against trade as this one would be controlled

was banned.

by Philadelphia law. Indeed, the Court applied the 'per
statute constitutes

the

to determine

"economic protectionism." In order

Supreme Court indicated

''

Id. at

626-27.

''

Id

626.

at

'M12

S.Ct. 2019 (1992).

that

se' rule

to avoid

and held

that the

Michigan

such a conclusion however,

Michigan should demonstrate a valid reason other than

71

Rather, Michigan attempted to persuade the Court that

economic reasons. Michigan

failed.

Dean Milk test should apply.

Rejecting this line of argument, the Court ruled that in a facially

discriminatory measure, the burden of proof that the same goal cannot be adequately

achieved by non-discriminatory alternatives must be met. Michigan failed this
the related

Maine

v.

state discrimination.

Similarly, in

test.

Further,

Taylor^°° requires that the regulating state offer justification for out-of

Michigan

failed this test too.

Chemical Waste Management

Philadelphia law and struck

down

Inc.

the tax applied

on

V.

Hunt^^^ the Court applied the

out-of-state waste imports.

The

respondent tried to justify the fee on environmental grounds. However, the court rejected the

argument on the ground of

availability of the "non-discriminatory alternatives."

That the per se standard of Philadelphia

is

limited in application and, that even a

discriminatory measure does not automatically attract Philadelphia law

Supreme Court's decision

in

Hughes v. Oklahoma}^-

export ban shipments of minnows from
application of the Philadelphia law
that the statute discriminates

on

Oklahoma waters was

face, the

evident from the

In Hughes, the validity of an

would have been justified.

its

is

Oklahoma

questioned. Arguably, the

Further, the Court conceded

Court held that "at a

minimum such

facial

discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and

of absence of non-discriminatory alternatives. "'°^ Though the Court noticed that "nondiscriminatory alternatives" could have been adopted, the Court in

'°°

'°'

477 U.S. 131 (1986).
112 S.Ct. 2009(1992).

'°M41 U.S. 322(1979).
'°^

Id. at

377.

Hughes nevertheless
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rejected the strict Philadelphia test

The Court buih on
Should the

D.

the Hughes' analysis in

WTO Adopt

not intended to

is

It

and instead applied the more balanced Dean Milk

Maine

v.

Taylor,

the Rule of Reason:

make

An

'""^

and other cases as

test.

well.'°'

Analysis

a comparison between the

two systems; '°^

rather, the

examination reveals that both the systems have developed a jurisprudence that reflects their
ability to foster integration

is

of trade and the environment by legal principles. However,

'°^
not to say that the principles developed by them do not have problems.

To be

this

sure, both

on guiding

the regimes have not been able to give us a clear set of criteria other than relying

phrases such as "arbitrary discrimination" and "disguised restriction" or "evenhandedness."

While they

bite the easy ones, they

that fall within

seem

have trouble when

to

it

comes

to testing

measures

uneasy borders.

Nevertheless, both the courts by their ingenious interpretation of the legal provisions

have in effect supplemented the vigor that was perceived lacking in the legislative arena for
adequate protection of the environment.

As demonstrated above,

the rule of reason

'°M77U.S. 131 (1986).
'°^

See eg.,New Energy Co. of Indiana

v.

Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).

'°^ee Geradin, supra note 15, for a comparative analysis of the approaches taken by the European

Union and

the United States. See also Walter, supra note 78 (the

comparison

is

primarily focused on the waste

cases).

'°''

For a criticism of the Pike analysis, see

out that the Pike analysis has several limitations.
test:

before any balancing

and be judged
incidental' in

is

e.g.,

First,

Vincent Blasi

III,

the Pike standard

supra note

13, at 186. Blasi points

employs only a "contingent balancing

must pass a three-pronged threshold scrutiny

to be undertaken, the state regulation

(1) 'even-handed', (2) designed to effectuate a legitimate local public interest'

its

effects

on

interstate

commerce." Second, the

test

"does not specify what

is

and (3) 'only
happen if a

to

regulation fails to pass the three-pronged threshold scrutiny." Third, "the Pike standard does not specify exactly

how

'the extent

of the burden' on commerce

is

to be assessed." Id.

For a criticism on adapting the approaches

of the European Court and the United States Supreme Court to the
at

481-486.

GATT,

see Chamovitz, supra note 14,

.

73

approach taken by the European Court of Justice and the Pike analysis taken by United
States

Supreme Court

in order to bring

'°^
issues are very similar.

equiHbrium between trade and the environment

The dominant method of analysis by both

balance between the two competing

goals.'""*

the courts

Such an approach has

is

to strike a

facilitated the process

of integrating trade and the environment.

The United

States has

more power granted

Supreme Court has ingeniously used

is

it

under the Commerce Clause. The

the "silence" of the Constitution to advance the free

Unlike protection of the environment, the free flow of interstate

flow of commerce.

commerce

to

a constitutionally

this goal vigorously,

it

mandated

goal.

Even though

realized that this pursuit

approach found in Pike exemplifies

is

the

Supreme Court advanced

not an end in

itself.

The balancing

this concern.

On the other hand, the European Union was cut from a different cloth. Not to mention
unlike the United States which

that,

origin. "°

slow.
that

Much

like the

is

GATT/WTO,

two centuries

old, the

to support

environmental laws

at the

of recent

legislative

commitment and

strength

an environmental regime. Realizing that the harmonization of

Community

'°*

ZlEGLER, supra note 26,

'°^

Geradin, supra note 15,

"°

is

the growth of environmental law regime has been

The European Union Treaty provisions lacked the

was needed

European Union

level is rather inadequate, the

European Court of

at 75.

at

1

9

1

The European Community (now European Union) was established by the Treaty of Rome
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5.

in

1958.
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Justice has been creative.'"

The theory of mandatory requirements or

the rule of reason

doctrine exempHfies this approach.

For the purpose of analysis, the European Union Treaty

The wordings of Article 36 of the European Union Treaty and

is

more

Article

closer to the

XX of the GATT

are

Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the European Court had to grapple with

similar.

key phrases

interpretations of

that define the

scope of the provision's application.

Consequently, the jurisprudence of the European Court was examined closely.
argues that the

E.

GATT.

WTO

This thesis

Dispute Settlement Body should adopt a rule of reason approach.

Structure of the Suggested Rule of Reason

From
reason that
doctrine

the

the

above analysis, an attempt

WTO Body may utilize

primarily contains three

Discrimination Test and, (3)

by the

made

in this section to

to reconcile trade

tests: (1)

GATT/WTO

test to the

develop a rule of

and environment disputes. The

The Proportionality

The Disguised Discrimination

of reason adds only the Proportionality
are applied

is

Test.

Test, (2)
It

The Arbitrary

may seem

that the rule

already existing other two conditions that

Panels. Nonetheless, as the foregoing analysis show, the

Proportionality principle tempers the other

two

both trade and environmental concerns.
suggested elements are not exhaustive.

tests as well

Moreover,

It is

law takes shape through application by the

left

it

open-ended

by placing equal emphasis

must be remembered
to let

to

that the

changes take place as the

WTO.

'" See Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The
Dual Character ofSupranationalism, Y.B. EUR.
267 (1982) taken from Nichols, supra note 14, at 713. "Joseph Weiler, who has long studied the European
Court of Justice, believes that active and independent judicial review is a critical element in making a
1

L.

supranational

body both

legitimate and effective."

Id.

.
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The Proportionality Test

1.

If there is

is

one principle

the Principle of

that cuts across the entire analysis

The European Court has used

Proportionality.

determine: whether measure

is

of the European Court,
this

it

principle to

necessary(or justified). Further, the Proportionality Principle

whether the challenged measure constitutes

has guided the European Court to examine

arbitrary discrimination or disguised discrimination.

While
"justified";

GATT uses the word

however the

latter

"necessary", the

has been interpreted to

out whether a particular measure

is

mean

"necessary.""- In order to find

"necessary", rather than

standard," the rule of reason approach

employ the

employs the Proportionality

measure may

be.

"least-restrictive

principle. This looks into

The degree of protection determines how

the level of protection the 'target' requires.
restrictive the challenged

European Union Treaty uses the word

A

very high level of protection for the target

requires stringent trade measures such as a total ban, absent adequate alternatives.

Oftentimes, the degree of protection required
state

subjective and

with burden of proof on them. Though scientific evidence

the degree of protection required,"^
application."'' In

"^

"^

mean two

See Hession

""W.
"^

some

cases,

it

See McDonald, supra note

"necessary" to

at

its

usefulness

is

1

,

at

434. Both the

supra note

17, at

may be

helpful to evaluate

into the scientific evidence."^

The

GATT and the European Union have held the term

things: exhaustion of available remedies

& Macrory,

best left to the regulating

circumscribed due to difficulties in

may not be needed to go

1

is

and proportionality.

Id. at

434.

201

200.

See Cassis case, supra note 28, which

of scientific evidence to
facts.

is

reject

illustrates the

European Court's

tactfiil

avoidance of the use

Germany's alcohol tolerance inducement claim and instead base

its

decision on

76
Proportionality principle rightly places emphasis on the environmental target to be protected.

On

the other hand, the "least-restrictive measure" standard

employed by

the

GATT

Panels

simply places emphasis on the challenged trade restriction and ignores the environmental
target. Further, the least trade restrictive

approach requires a scaling of the "restrictiveness"

of the measures. As Esty points out. a lesser restrictive measure
consequently the

test

becomes almost insurmountable."^

Arbitrary Discrimination

2.

Non-discrimination
in

always conceivable and

is

is

a

first

principle. Its violation is rarely excused. Nevertheless,

warranted circumstances, discrimination becomes a non-issue."^ The crucial question

then

is

whether the measure

analysis,

it is

evident that a measure

becomes

arbitrary

when

measure

falls

requirements.

Member

In the case of the

makes

is

not

a discrimination

European Union, the European Court looks

to see if the

under either the heads of justification under Article 36 or the mandatory

A

becomes hard

national measure

States have very

little

United States, the approach

is

discretion if the

more or

Community law

to justify if

Community has harmonized

less similar. Federal

law pre-empts

state

power. In

Daniel C. Esty, Greening the Gatt: Trade, Environment, and the Future 48

"^

See Danish Bottles case, supra note 36; see also Geradin, supra note

5, at

1

85.

"It is

(1994).

noteworthy

The Court focused exclusively on the
reasoning of the European Court and argues

Geradin however criticizes the
European Court should have examined discrimination as an

principle of proportionality." Id.

"* See Oliver, supra note 20, at

1

exists.

the law. In the

"*

that the [European] Court did not raise the issue of discrimination.

that the

the above

a "proper justification"

provided. Put differently, the absence of a valid justification
arbitrary }^^

From

at issue constitutes "arbitrary discrimination."

1

82.

issue. Id.
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the absence of federal legislation, the Court

is

convinced about the power of States

to

regulate their environment."'^
Further,

out that Courts must look for "similarity"

of

has clearly articulated this position in the Italy

v.

analysis points

the

circumstances. The European Court

Commission^ -^ case. Indeed, the language of the chapeau
notion

when

it

any measure

states that

is

in Article

XX clearly captures this

"subject to the limitation that

it

does not constitute

a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination where the same conditions prevail"^'''
It

of Article

may

also be suggested that the term "unjustifiable discrimination" in the

XX is superfluous.

numerous

In

ih.Q justification test.

It is

seen that the "arbitrary discrimination"
cases, the

chapeau

test incorporates

GATT Panels have agreed in principle with the

regulating state that the target of protection

is

a valid justification to take regulatory

measures.'"" However, the measures have failed to satisfy the other conditions.

Furthermore,

ended

it

is

clear that arbitrary discrimination has

what

definition. Rather than define

Court has struck
justifications.

down

cases in which

The case-law ofHenn

&

it

'arbitrary discrimination'

felt that

the

Darby^^^ and Conegate^''^ are

"'

See City of Philadelphia

'^°

Supra note

'-'

Art.

'^^

See chapter

II,

supra note 26 and accompanying

'"'

Case 34/79,

R.

v.

XX,

New

Jersey,

437 U.S.

at

623.

46.

GATT

(emphasis added).

text.

Henn and Darby, [19791 E.C.R. 3795.

'^'Case 121/85, 5Mpra note 51.

means, the European

measures did not disclose proper

cases were total bans on public morality grounds.

v.

been given a rather open-

illustrative.

However,

in

Henn

Both these

&

Darby,

78
notwithstanding the fact that there was absolute ban, the European Court concluded that
there

was no

arbitrary discrimination because the

"[European Court] was willing

to find that

United Kingdom law did restrain the manufacture and marketing of pornography sufficiently
to enable

it

to

conclude that there was no lawful trade." ''^ In contrast, the European Court in

Conegate "reached the opposite conclusion: the
to

amount

to a prohibition

restrictions

which existed could not be

on domestic manufacture or marketing."'"^ The discrimination

seen such as in Conegate could not be justified. The meaning of
discrimination'

was

said

further clarified

by the European Court

in the

the term 'arbitrary

REWE case.'-^

In

REWE,

the fact that the imported products were subject to phytosanitary inspection although

domestic products were not subject to an equivalent examination
constitute arbitrary discrimination.'"^

Court's approach.

It

might be taken to

Such a conclusion would be flawed under the European

reasoned that mere differences in treatment of imported and domestic

products should not mislead the Court. If there

is

a justifiable need, such as the "need to

prevent the spread of harmful organism" from foreign apples, then the measure could not

be

regarded as constituting arbitrary discrimination "if effective measures are taken" '"^

likewise to prevent the harmful organism on the domestic front as well.

'"

Craig & De BurCA, supra note

27, at 600.

'~Ud. at 601.
'" Case 4/75, supra note 39.

'-'

'^'

Id.

Id.

See also Maine

v.

Taylor,

trade restrictions on the ground that

it

477 U.S.

1

3

was necessary

1

(

1

986)(where the Court upheld the

to prevent the spread

statute that

of livebaitfish disease).

imposed
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Disguised Restriction

3.

Because
motives,

is

it

substantive

Rather,

it

this test is

suggested that

test.

is

designed to

It is

it

test if the

challenged measure has any protectionist

might be more appropriately classified as part of the

not merely to examine and to test the measure in

its

application.

used to detect wrong or ulterior motives such as a non-economic reasons or

protection of one's domestic industry. Unlike arbitrary discrimination

which exposes lack

a valid justification, disguised discrimination exposes a lack of proper motives. This

exemplified in the Commission

domestic production. But

it

v.

United Kingdom, ""^^ where, the

It

is

test.

Notably, the Appellate

Body

this is the

clearly articulated this

decision in the United States Gasoline Standards case in which

its

best

purpose was to protect

was couched on animal and health grounds. Indeed,

purpose of the disguised restriction
aspect in

real

is

it

states that:

clear to us that "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in

international trade.

It is

equally clear that concealed or

unannounced

restriction or

discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of "disguised
restriction."'^'

Not

all

Commission

v.

cases however present a distinct presence of wrong motives as found in the

United Kingdom.

It is

not hard to imagine cases where genuine motives exist,

which might nonetheless become distorted

in their application.

The measure could have

negative effects of trade. In such cases, the Proportionality principle should guide whether
the incidental effects on trade can be excused.

If the

impact on trade

than the putative benefits, then the challenged measure

™ Case 40/82, supra note 56.
'" Id. at

629.

may

is

clearly excessive

not be allowed.
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It

might be troubling to notice however that even where the measure

justified, this test has the effect

This

questionable results.

measures

might be avoided

pitfall

on

trade, "the

The disguisedness

evidence that a measure

is

undoubtedly

of nullifying the measure as invalid. This might lead

constitutes a disguised restriction
justified" increases.

is

if in

to

cases where the restriction

presumption that [the measure] was not

or the protectionist motives should be viewed "as

not justified."'^" This approach gives

that are valid in themselves, while

flexibilit>' to

Courts to allow

having some trade distortions subject

to

Proportionality.
4.

Article
It

XX(g) Analysis

may be

GATT. As

noticed that the above analysis has not touched on Article

XX(g) of the

demonstrated above, Article XX(b) has a companion in Article 36 of the

European Union Treaty or the mandatory requirements.

Article

XX(g) does

not.

Consequently, the jurisprudence relating to terms found in Article XX(g) form a separate
analysis. Chapter

II

above examined

have interpreted Article XX(g).
sure, the

It is

above analysis applies

how the GATT

clear that the
to

Panels and the

WTO Appellate Body

chapeau applies to Article XX(g). To be

the application of the

Chapeau terms

"arbitrary

discrimination" and "disguised restriction."

With regard
Appellate

Body

to the interpretation

in the

United States

of Article XX(g), the interpretation given to

Gasoline Standards case

rejected the line of reasoning followed by the previous

GATT

is

it

by the

correct. This decision

Panels.

Importantly, the

Appellate Body's view relaxes the standard of review under Article XX(g) for genuine

'" See

Oliver, supra note 20,

at 185. [italics in

Wine') [1980] E.C.R. 2299, as an authority for

original](01iver cites

this proposition).

Commission

v.

France

{^'Italian
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conservation goals.
disputes to give

it

The view of

the Appellate

the value and credibility

it

Body should be

deserves.

re-affirmed in future

CHAPTER IV
THE UNITED STATES' SHRIMP BAN: AN ANALYSIS
Introduction and Background

A.

The reader will

recall that

it

was proposed

to take the opportunity to

examine the

rule

of reason approach on a current problem. The problem chosen to apply the rule of reason
is

the United States' ban on importation of shrimp and shrimp products

manner causing high mortality

to the

endangered species of marine sea

would show, the tuna-ban and the shrimp ban
opportunity to try the rule of reason and

are identical. Thus,

make

it

unfolded

is

On May

turtles.

As

the facts

gives us an excellent

a comparison of the analysis and outcome

under the rule of reason with that of the existing
as

it

harvested in a

WTO analysis.

The

facts

of the shrimp ban

outlined below.
1,

1996, the United States imposed a ban on the importation of shrimp and

shrimp products caught by methods that could adversely affect the endangered species of
sea turtles.

The ban was implemented pursuant

International Trade (CIT)' and,

(ESA), as amended

in 1989.

was based on

of the United States Court of

to the orders

the United States'

Section 609 of the

amended

Endangered Species Acf

ESA

("Turtle law") prohibits

importation of shrimp or products from shrimp which have been harvested with commercial
fishing technology that affect adversely certain species of sea turtles. Further, the Turtle

'

Earth Island Institute

M6U.S.C. §1531

v.

Christopher, 913 F. Supp. 559 (1995).

etseq.

82

.

83

law requires
turtles is

certification with documentar>' evidence that the "incidental taking"

comparable

to that

of sea

of the United States: and that the "fishing environment" does not

pose a threat to sea turtles/

Beginning January

1993,

1,

States fishing in the waters of the

the commercial shrimp trawl vessels in the United

all

Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean from North

Carolina to Texas were required to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs)
areas/ Since the United States' shrimp fishermen had to use
area,

it

was determined

if similar efforts

that the efforts for conservation

TEDs

in the

Sec. 609.
(b)(1)

IN

.

in those areas.

TEDs was

limited."

988, 1037-38 (1989). In pertinent part, the statute reads:

Stat.

(a)

all

above geographical

were not made as well by foreign fishermen fishing

Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103

times in

of sea-turtles would be undermined

Accordingly, the geographical scope requiring foreign fishermen to use

^

at all

.

GENERAL. ~ The importation of shrimp or products from shrimp which have been

harvested with commercial fishing technology which

may

affect adversely such species of sea

be prohibited not later than May 1, 1991, except as provided in paragraph (2).
CERTIFICATION PROCEDURE.- The ban on importation of shrimp or products from shrimp

turtles shall

(2)

pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not apply

May

not later than

1

,

1

99

1

,

if

the President shall determine

and annually thereafter

that

and

certify to the

Congress

—

(A) the government of the harvesting nation has provided documentary evidence of the adoption of
a regulatory

program governing the incidental taking of such sea

harvesting that

is

comparable

to that

course of such

turtles in the

of the United States; and

(B) the average rate of that incidental taking by the vessels of the harvesting nation
the average rate of incidental taking of sea turtles

by United States vessels

is

in the

comparable

to

course of such

harvesting; or

(C) the particular fishing environment of the harvesting nation does not pose a threat of the incidental
taking of such sea turtles in the course of such harvesting.

"

913

F.

Supp. 559, 573 (1995), citing Revised Guidelines for determining comparability of foreign

programs for the protection of turtles
*

913

Id.

F. Supp., at 574.

in

shrimp trawl fishing operations, 58 Fed. Reg.90\S (Feb.

18, 1993).

"In passing section 609, Congress recognized that these conservation measures

taken by U.S. shrimp fishermen would be of limited effectiveness unless a similar level of protection
afforded throughout the

Ocean."

Id.

turtles'

is

migratory range across the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean and western Atlantic

84

On

challenge, the United States

CIT

held that the Turtle law does not contain any

geographical limitations and directed the United States to apply the Turtle law against
nations that caught shrimp in a turtle unfriendly
limitations.^ Subsequently, the

countries have

manner regardless of geographical

United States sought a modification of deadline for one year,

The United

which was refused/

States

Department of State had determined

met the requirements of the Turtle law; shrimp imports from

countries were banned.^

all

Under the revised

that

all

36

other

guidelines, the United States had "determined that

import prohibitions imposed pursuant to section 609 do not apply to shrimp or products of

shrimp harvested in a

turtle friendly manner."'^

As

such, the United States applied the Turtle

law on a shipment-by-shipment basis with an exporter's declaration

complied with. The declaration was required

to

accompany

TEDs was

"disingenuous." The

CIT

law was

the shipment throughout the

export process. This procedure of allowing shrimp caught using

caught without

that the Turtle

TEDs

challenged before the United States

CIT

and banning shrimp
as "dangerous"

and

rejected the United States' claims and held that the shrimp ban

applies against the harvesting nation. '° Accordingly, the United States

banned import of all

shrimp and shrimp products from nations that do not show proof that

it

turtle

conservation program similar to the United States.

'913

F.

Now,

in order to gain access to the

Supp. at574.

^

Earth Island Institute v. Christopher, 922 F. Supp. 616 (Apr. 10, 1996).

*

Earth Island Institute

'

Id. at

600.

v.

Christopher, 942 F. Supp. 597 (Oct.

8,

has adopted a sea-

1996).
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United States market, shrimp exporting countries must require their shrimp industry to use

TEDs

at all times.

Shrimp
States

market.

is

the

most valuable

According

to a

fishery

80%

in the

United

1993 estimate, about 600 million pounds of shrimp were

imported into the United States valued

account for approximately

and the most popular seafood item

at

roughly $2.17 billion. Moreover, shrimp imports

of domestic consumption with only

20%

of domestically

produced shrimp." Out of nearly 120 nations that export shrimp, Thailand, Ecuador, Mexico,
India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh,

The member
complaint before the

States affected

WTO. On

filed a joint complaint.

nullification

the

WTO

by the United

October

8,

States'

ban have predictably

filed a

1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand

They have alleged

and impairment of benefits of the

violations of articles

GATT

1994. At

its

I,

XI and XIII and

February 25th meeting,

Dispute Settlement Body established a panel. Australia, Colombia, the

Philippines, Singapore,

Hong Kong,

have reserved their third-party rights
to

and Honduras are the leading exporters of shrimp.'"

be decided.'^ The Panel's ruling

" U.S. Department of

India,

in this matter.

is

Commerce

Guatemala, Mexico, Japan, Nigeria and

As on June

expected early next

Statistics,

Sri

25, 1997, the dispute

EC

Lanka

was

yet

year.''*

\993. as cited \n9\3 F. Supp.

559,570 (1995).

''5ee913F. Supp. at570.
'^5ee Overview of the State-of-play of
(visited 07/08/97).

'"

The Overview

is

See Turtles: Shrimp dispute

(July 15, 1997) citing

WTO Disputes,

<http;//www.wto.org/dispute/bulletin.html>

upto date as on June 25, 1997.

tests

US

aim

Ghana Schoenberger, Wall

to protect species,

ENVIRN

Street Journal, July 15, 1997.

Library,

Cumws

file,

LEXIS
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B.

Law

Should the Turtle

The

Turtle law

is

a

be Allowed?

PPM

to the tuna-ban.

identical

in facts

be

under the

GATT Panels held the tuna-ban to

illegal

GATT. Both

a domestic law of the United States and applied in a
fishing practices of other countries. Failure to

Both are

markets.

do so

manner

to the

was seen

that requires the

shrimp out of which around

change of

United States

process based bans which are proscribed under the
this

that the

the bans are based on

results in non-access to the

Considering the number of countries that are affected by
sixty nations export

It

GATT

law.

law—over one hundred and

thirty six nations

have standards comparable

United States— the United States seeks a world wide change of fishing practices.

Literally, the

United States Congress

may

be said to have legislated for the world.

In defense of the Turtle law, a strong policy justification for the United States

is

that

the sea-turtles are an endangered species. Unlike dolphins, sea-turtles are listed under the

CITES. '^ That this
United States

is

worthy of conservation by trade

restrictions is

strengthens and furthers

Turtle law

of no doubt. Further, the

the policy goals of

the

CITES.

Consequently, the import ban under the Turtle law should not be viewed as a ban under a
domestic law. However, such a claim

may

on the ESA, a domestic law of the United
is

pursuant to the CITES,

it

not be persuasive, since the shrimp ban
States;

it

has no extrajurisdictional effect

world wide

'^

in application.

not

is

based on CITES.

If a

based

measure

should follow the policies and procedures prescribed therein.

Similarly, a claim that the application of the Turtle
it

is

is

may

law

is

not an unilateral action nor that

not hold ground, since the measure seeks to reach

Notwithstanding, as sea-turtles are listed under the CITES, and

See Convention on International Trade

1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243

Trade and Environmental Protection

;

in

Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and

see also Janet McDonald, Greening the

in the

New World Order,

Flora, Mar. 3,

GATT: Harmonizing Free

23 Envtl. L. 397, 450 (1993).

87

due

United States has jurisdiction to pursue

to the fact that they are migratory, the

conservation measures under the "shared environment" argument.
a measure; accordingly

Panel pointed out,

it

could be justified under Article

if the target

turtles and, not shrimp.

of conservation

is

The shrimp ban

XX. Nonetheless,

sea-turtles the

is

such

as the tuna-ban

measure must regulate sea-

Further, in the tuna-dolphin dispute, the process ban rested on a

between tuna and dolphins; no such relationship

particular "symbiotic relationship"

is

observed between shrimp and sea-turtles.

WTO Analysis of the Shrimp Ban

C.

The

1.

The Like Product

Issue

The preliminary question

to

be examined would be whether the foreign shrimp and

the United states shrimp are like products.

It is

well established that the "likeness" of the

product depends on the products themselves and not on the
In this case, the Turtle

a

US

law

is

a

PPM ban.

There

is

way

it

is

produced or processed.

no difference between foreign shrimp or

shrimp as a product. Consequently, they would be considered "like products."

2.

Is

the

Measure Necessary?

As a first step,

the Panel

would

identify the

Within each of their domestic jurisdictions,
shrimp

in a

manner comparable

producers use

TEDs

at all times.

to the

This

that is the subject

the

its

mandate of the Turtle law.

products

declaration that the said shipment of shrimp

of the dispute.

the shrimp harvesting nations

United States. This requires that

is

States allowed shipments of shrimp or

all

measure

if

it

all

must catch

foreign shrimp

Earlier, the

was accompanied by

United

the exporter's

was caught using TEDs. Now, because

the

United States CIT expanded the scope of application of the Turtle law, shrimp can be
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exported to the United States only

shrimp

is

measure

is

ban under Article XX(b) exception,

On the contrary,

to see if alternative

it

is

burden

This

a necessary one.

creating a zero trade situation

method.

harvesting nation has been certified that

all

of

its

harvested using TEDs.

In order to justify the

the

if the

the

most

law

is

on the United

between two member countries

is

itself

that

important to
States.

show

To begin

that

with,

not the least-trade restrictive

trade-restrictive. Further, the

and inconsistent measures

available.'^ Indeed, the Turtle

lies

it

WTO panel would look

could be reasonably employed are

provides alternate measures such as negotiation for

the "development of bilateral or multilateral agreements" with other countries.'^

Other

measures such as labelling could also be effectively used. Moreover, the United States must
prove to the satisfaction of the
reasonably available to

it.

It

WTO

Panel that least restrictive

measures were not

could be said that exhaustion of available remedies or atleast

an attempt to pursue the remedies before resorting to the challenged measures would be very
persuasive to the Panel. Finally, under the tuna-ban Panel analysis, the
likely

conclude that a measure whose intended effect

is

WTO Panel would

predicated on change in policies of

other countries could not be considered "necessary."'^

^^

See Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M.

839 (June, 1994)[hereinafter Second Tuna Panel].
''

Pub. L. No. 101-162, Section 609 (a)(1)

'*

See Second Tuna Panel, supra note

1

6.

-

(5) (1989).
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3.

Article

XX(g)

The Panel would

readily concede that turtles constitute an exhaustible natural

resource and thus they would

with the policy of conservation.''' Prior to the Appellate

fall

Body's decision in the United States Gasoline Standards case"°, the question the Panel would

frame was whether the measure held inconsistent under Article

III

analysis could be

considered as a measure "relating to" the conservation policy. Such an analysis borrows the
legal conclusion

under one

set

of criterion and applies

related to the conservation efforts.

whether the measure

is

its

is

measure was

Under the current analysis, the test would have

of the Turtle law, section 609 of the amended

stated policy is to conserve sea-turtles.

the use of which

to find if the

to

in fact

examine

related to the objective sought to be achieved—conservation of turtles.

An examination of the provisions
reveal that

it

viewed as an adequate means

It

Further, the Panel

would examine

requires shrimp trawls to use

to conserve sea-turtles.

Panel would find that the measure—the use of TEDs—
to see if the

ESA would

is

TEDs,

Accordingly, the

related to the policy goal.

measure has been "made effective

in

conjunction with domestic consumption or production." Again, under the tuna-ban analysis,
the test

was whether

relaxed the

test.

It

it

was "primarily aimed

come

into effect."''

'''McDonald, ^wpra notelS,

"°

Body has

at

441.

is

to

be read as

The existence of an international agreement "seemed
was a need for conservation measures." Id

to be

[tuna-ban] Panel's determination that there

Report of the Appellate Body

W

the Appellate

Likewise, "in conjunction with"

in

United States

-

Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996)[hereinafter the Gasoline Standards case].

'

Now,

held that "made effective" refers to the measures being "operative, as "in

force" or as having

critical to the

at" conservation.

at

623.
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"together with" or "jointly with"."

"made

effective"

4.

The Chapeau Analysis
Though

and

Under

terminology, the Turtle law would pass the

this

"in conjunction with" test as well.

the United States measure has satisfied the test under Article XX(g). the

measure must pass the requirements

set out in the

States Gasoline Standards case, the

WTO

chapeau of Article XX.

Appellate

Body announced

In the United

that "the kinds

of

considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts
to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination",

may

also be taken into account in determining

the presence of a "disguised restriction" on international trade.""''

Having

said that the "purpose" of the

exceptions, the Appellate

chapeau

is to

detect abuse or misuse of the

Body analysis suggests that the adequacy of alternatives forms

of this analysis. Indeed, the burden

lies

on the United States

to prove

it

part

did not have any

reasonable alternatives other than a ban against nations and discriminating between domestic

and imported shrimp products. The United States could argue

that there

is

essentially

no

discrimination between nations that have regulatory programs comparable to the United
States.

The import ban

applies only to nations that do not have such conservation policies;

and as such, they would not be countries "where same conditions prevail."
are several other alternatives such as labelling

and cooperative

However, there

agreements, which the

United States could have pursued. Further, the United States could have allowed a shipment

by shipment import of shrimp or
restrictive than a total ban.

''Id
''

Id

at

629.

its

products.

Moreover, the United

Such a regulation
States' Turtle

is

definitely less trade

law could be suspect

in

view
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of the fact that the domestic shrimp industry

consumption of shrimp.
conservancy program."^
It is

On

is

only twenty percent of the United States'

the one hand, this market

On the

other hand,

incumbent on the United States

it

power favors

the effectiveness of the

could be suspected as protectionist in nature.

to establish that

it is

not protectionist of

its

domestic

industry.

More

troubling to the Panel

would be

the fact that the United States, through

its

Turtle law, has legislated for the world. In order to export to the United States, the shrimp

harvesting nations— around one hundred and thirty nations— are required to

show proof that

they have sea-turtle conservation programs comparable to the United States, which

TEDs

at all times.

interests.

Such an economic balkanization or

Moreover,

it is

isolation

is

is to

use

detrimental to free trade

noteworthy mention here that the United States has not applied the

import ban pursuant to any international environmental agreement. Under the tuna-ban
analysis, this

would have been

sufficient to reject the

measure as

G ATT/WTO

inconsistent.

Thus, the Panel would most likely view that the Turtle law constitutes "unjustifiable
discrimination" and a "disguised discrimination on international trade."
It is

seen that even though the Turtle law

general exceptions,
analysis. Article

^''

XX

justifiable

under Article XX(g) of the

not justified under the chapeau of Article

would not excuse

XX as a whole.

In final

the United States' shrimp ban.

See Steve Chamovitz, Recent Developments: Environmental Trade Sanctions and the GATT:

Analysis of the Pelly
(1994).

it is

is

Amendment on Foreign Environmental

Practices, 9

AM. U.

J.

INT'L L.

& POL'Y

An

751
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The Rule

D.

of Reason Analysis

In this section, a rule of reason analysis

pass the analysis.

compared

to the

As demonstrated above,

GATT/WTO

the rule of reason

is

is

made

to see if

would

it

a less stringent test

when

analysis.

The Proportionality Test

1.

In the foregoing analysis,

it

was strongly urged

subject to a rule of reason analysis

Accordingly, the Panel would

what

is

first

if the

term "necessary" should be

may

measure employed

is

the policy goal of the measure. Second.

be needed for protection of the

Indeed the burden

lies

that the conservation

on the United

States.

it

hesitation to concede

total

that the sea-turtles require the degree of

ban of imports of shrimp and the use of TEDs

has been estimated that over one hundred thousand sea-turtles die annually due

commercial fishing

It

it

means should be adopted.

The Panel would have no

must show

has sought to implement: a

at all times. It

Third,

of sea-turtles constitute a valid environmental protection. With regard

to second question, the United States

protection

target.

proportional, or disproportionate or excessive.

is

are less restrictive alternatives available, then such a

If there

^^

that the

which applies the Principle of Proportionality.

determine what

the degree of protection that

would examine

to

of the shrimp ban

activities.'^

was estimated

that annually

The United

States

must be required

124,000 sea-turtles die due to shrimp fishing

Island Institute estimated that the United States accidentally killed around

This figure was extrapolated to calculate the average
to 124,000 sea-turtles.

kill

1

provided the Court with opinion of scientists to claim that sea-turtles migrate
F.

Supp.

at

559.

The Earth

of all the other shrimp harvesting nations which came
for a large share.

States law has identified five species of sea-turtles as endangered or threatened.

913

activities.

such a

1,000 sea-turtles without TEDs.

Out of these, the major shrimp producers would account

Institute v. Christopher,

to support

The Earth

in large areas.

The United

Island Institute

See Earth Island
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claim. "^

Indeed, as mentioned above, that sea-turtles are listed in the

Even though

justification.

CITES

of conservation of the sea

turtles.

By banning

or aquacultured could be
addition, there are other

Particularly,

all

product

all

this

methods such as

some burden

stages of import,

More

shrimp exports constitute both wild and

viewed as excessive and disproportionate

causes

it

to the objective

shrimp products regardless whether they were wild

labelling.

allowed shrimp imports that were caught using

Even though,

a strong

the claim of the United States could be well supported, the Panel

would have problem accepting the world-wide shrimp ban as proportional

acquacultured shrimp.

is

to the policy goals.

In

Arguably, the United States could have

TEDs

with a certification from the exporter.

in that the certificate is required to

accompany

the

could be excused considering the objective.

importantly, the Panel

would have trouble with the issue of PPM. The above

analysis of the case-law clearly indicates that the measure

must deal with the products

themselves. Trade restrictions for non-products are frowned upon; and they are restricted
to

concerns

troublesome

within the domestic jurisdiction.
to

allow

PPMs

The

rule

of reason analysis also finds

it

and, trade restrictions that go beyond the regulating country's

domestic jurisdiction.

Thus, even under the rule of reason analysis, the measure would be considered
excessive and disproportionate.

^^

On

June

17, 1997,

a group of scientists called

on the

WTO

not to support the complaint by

Malaysia, India, Thailand, and Pakistan against the United States' shrimp ban

by more than 160

scientists

Reporter, June 25, 1997.

from 24 countries was introduced supporting the

in the

US

WTO. A

ban. See

Statement signed

BNA INT'L TRADE
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Arbitrary Discrimination

2.

United States law had required foreign nations to harvest shrimp with

If the

TEDs

with no such corresponding requirement for domestic shrimp producers, such a measure

would

constitute arbitrary discrimination. That

is

not the case.

Rather, the Turtle law

discriminates between shrimp caught by shrimp harvesting nations that do not have

programs comparable

United States and those that do have such programs. Such a

not justifiable unless the United States supports

discrimination

is

justification.

may

It

to the

be pointed out that there

is

its

measure with proper

no justifiable difference between imported

and domestic shrimp as a "product." Consequently, the Panel must conclude that the United
States' Turtle

law operates

in a

manner which

Further, the United States has based

concerns.

Undoubtedly,

jurisdiction.

However,

it

its

constitutes arbitrary discrimination.

measure on a domestic law for non-domestic

has the right to protect the resources within

its

domestic

a unilateral regulation requiring foreign governments to enact

regulatory programs comparable to the United States could not be justified. If the United
States

had acted pursuant

could be

made

to a multilateral

out. Indeed,

by acting

agreement such as the CITES, a valid justification

unilaterally, the

cause of the environment

advanced. For instance, the problem of commercial extinction of sea-turtles
to the
If the

United States geographical region. Nor

problem

is

global, then

mentioned above, a CITES
therein.

result

Similarly, a large

measures

it

not unique

a concern with geographical limitations.

As

could be conserved under rules and procedure

fish species

of commercial fishing bycatch.

not fully

that are effective globally should be pursued.

listed target

number of

is

is

is

A

and natural resources are affected as a

unilateral policy choice

would only cure the

95

symptoms

rather than the disease.

On

the other hand, a multilateral action could be

more

effective in solving environmental problems."''

Disguised Restriction

3.

For any measure to be dismissed as a disguised
be protectionist

in nature.

measure

at issue

must

Reasons other than those supplied by the regulating country must

be found. In the case of the shrimp ban,
First, as

restriction, the

would be hard

it

to

come

to such a conclusion.

demonstrated above, the ban was imposed pursuant to the court orders. Second, the

legislative goal

of the Endangered Species Act as amended

from dangers of commercial fishing
to the attention

activities.

is clear:

protection of sea turtles

However, the complaining

parties could bring

of the Panel that the United States has a huge market for shrimp. The market

share of imported shrimp well exceed, by nearly sixty percent, the domestic production of

shrimp which

As

early as

is

dominated by the U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region shrimp

in 1985, a

Commission had noted

industry."^

the complaint of the U.S. shrimp industry

See Laura B. Campbell, Comment on the Paper by Robert Reinstein, in SUSTAINABLE
Development and International Law 233 (Winfried Lang ed., 1995). With the Montreal Protocol as an
-'

illustration,

Campbell argues

problems."

Id.

that a multilateral

approach

is

"more effective

in

solving global environmental

Further, she states that rather than use unilateral trade restrictions, multilateral policy choice

could benefit from a "combination of measures."

Id.

For instance, the Montreal Protocol uses a combination

of measures such as "those concerning ongoing scientific evaluation of the causes of ozone depletion and the
effectiveness of

its

environmental standards and control measures, special and differential treatment for

developing countries, industrial rationalization

of

ozone-depleting chemical production, and financing

technology transfer and technical assistance for developing countries.
^^

el al.,

" Id.

See Report of the Commissioners Paula Stem, Chairwoman,; Susan W. Liebeler, Vice Chairman;

pursuant to a request of Ambassador William E. Brock, the U.S. Trade Representative on Oct.

5,

1984.

was made "for the purpose of gathering and presenting information on the competitive,
technological, and economic factors affecting the performance of the U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic shrimp
industry", 1985 ITC LEXIS 144, 3 (1985).
The

investigation
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about their injury from shrimp
harvesting

is

imports."'^

Commission

noticed, the

Even though

as a specific problem. '°

Though

problem of bycatch of shrimp

failed to recognize the by-catch

of marine

turtles

the United States could stress the urgency of the

restoration of endangered species of sea-turtles
likely

the

and justify the shrimp ban, the Panel would

emphasize the availability of adequate alternatives

to reach the

same goal and

reject

the United States' arguments.
In sum. the Turtle law as applied
restriction

-''

on trade by the United

Id.

"Member of the

about their competitive position

Shrimp harvesters

Shrimp

2.

in

Access has been

3.

States.

U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region shrimp industry have expressed concerns
in the

U.S. market, largely in terms of competition from shrimp imports.

The

Gulf and South Atlantic region are being injured as a result of imports;
foreign countries benefit from government assistance, which makes their

in the

industries in

products more competitive

likely to be declared as constituting a disguised

Gulf and South Atlantic region shrimp industry are as follows:

principal claims of the U.S.
1.

is

the U.S. market; and
restricted to traditionally

open foreign shrimping grounds, particularly off the

coast of Mexico, thus limiting U.S. Gulf and South Atlantic region harvesters to U.S. waters and increasing
the pressure

'°

on shrimping

Id.

activities." Id. at 5.

The Commission reports that "[t]here is a significant bycatch, or incidental catch,
Most of the bycatch in the Gulf area is composed of ground fish such as

at 63.

associated with shrimp harvesting.
Atlantic Croaker, spot

,

sand

citrate,

bycatch consists mostly of "trash"

and sea

fish,

but

croaker, and spot, are captured. Id. at 66.

catfish

and

is

discarded

at sea. ... In the

some commercially important

South Atlantic area, the

species such as whiting, flounder,

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
It is

worth reiterating that global trade and protection of the environment are policy

goals fundamental to the well-being of the society. This thesis maintains that the goals of
free trade

and environmental protection can be accommodated and reconciled within the

GATT/WTO

framework.

However, as the above study has shown

us,

the tuna-ban

jurisprudence has revealed an overemphasis on trade concerns exposing the need for the
protection of environmental values. Further, the austere legal standards created by the tuna-

ban rulings has done

little

particular, the Appellate

changed the scenario

help to reconcile the two policy goals.

Subsequent rulings,

in

Body's decision in the United States Gasoline Standards case has

for the better

from a

free trader's perspective, but

much

is left

to

be

desired from an environmentalist perspective.

This thesis recommends that the "least-trade restrictive" interpretation of Article

of the

GATTAVTO should be relaxed.

by the

WTO

Rather, a rule of reason approach should be adopted

Dispute Settlement Body.

First, this

sufficient flexibility to lower the threshold

measures and

free trade.

Second,

XX

doctrine

would give

the

WTO

Panels

and accommodate genuine environmental

subjecting the challenged trade measure to a rule of

reason analysis would also discourage any economic protectionism or disguised restriction
that

may

seek shelter from global competition. Disguised trade restrictions that wear the

environmental

mask should

fail.

However, environmental measures

97

that

do not

98
unnecessarily hinder trade should be allowed.

enhance the

ability

would not allow

of the

rule

WTO to balance the two goals.

of reason would

reason doctrine.

facilitate

and

Furthermore, the rule of reason

As

trade restrictions unrelated to the products themselves.

analysis illustrates,

production or process-based bans would also

fail

the shrimp ban

under the rule of

Also, this thesis maintains that multilateral solutions should be preferred

over unilateral actions.

commitment

The

environmental instruments which reflect the

Multilateral

to protect certain environmental values

rule of reason than

would be given more

effect

under the

under the existing tuna-ban analysis. Measures pursuant to the CITES,

the Montreal Protocol, or the Basel Convention, for example,

which

are doubtful under the

tuna-ban analysis would be valid under the rule of reason doctrine.

Numerous environmental and
be found

if

we

are to successfully resolve the

comprehensive approach
this regard, multilateral

WTO

trade issues are

to integrate trade

on the horizon. Lasting solutions must

A

trade and environment conflicts.

and environmental

interests

must be made.

In

forums such as the Committee on Trade and Environment of the

could be effectively used.

While proceeding

in the right direction,

'harmonization' efforts of the Committee on Trade and Environment

is

the

ongoing

rather slow.

The

WTO Member States should actively support and pursue the agendas of the Committee on
Trade and Environment.

Trade and Environment policymakers should approach the

Committee with an understanding of each
and global community.

On

its part,

the

other's significance

and role

Committee must involve the

in

an interdependent

participation of non-

governmental organizations, environmental groups and non-profit organizations.

Committee must be more transparent and be accessible

to input

from the public as

The

well.
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Lastly, the thesis topic

the

answer

that exists

is

posed the question, "are tuna and dolphins the same?"

obvious, this author,

who was

struck by the strange "symbiotic relationship"

between tuna and dolphins, believes

similar symbiotic relationship.

with similar view.

It is

While

the author's

that global trade

hope

that

and environment share a

everyone will approach the subject
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